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As latecomers to global business competition, emerging-market multinational companies 
(EMNCs) utilize cross-border merger and acquisitions to swiftly acquire strategic assets, such as 
brands and distribution channels, compensating for their competency deficiency. Developed 
markets with well-established firms and well-developed market-supporting institutions become 
important destinations for EMNCs’ strategic asset-seeking investments. Institutional distance, 
national differences in the institutional environment, constitutes a major source of competitive 
disadvantage for foreign firms competing with indigenous firms. Foreign firms need to overcome 
the challenges of unfamiliarity, relational, and discriminatory hazards to establish legitimacy in 
the host market. Compared to established multinationals that originate from other advanced 
markets (AMNCs), EMNCs potentially face additional legitimacy threats derived from their 
countries of origin. Facing large institutional distance, AMNCs are likely to take less ownership 
to rely on a local firm’s legitimacy, but EMNCs may lack the opportunity to find a willing local 
partner. The findings of the current study generally support that the negative association between 
institutional distance and ownership position is less apparent for EMNCs than for AMNCs. 
Furthermore, not all emerging markets are homogeneous in their country development. EMNCs, 
originating from countries with higher levels of human capital development and global 
connectedness are less impacted by institutional distance in their ownership strategy. The 
findings of the current study also suggest EMNCs’ firm level characteristics have minimal 
effects in alleviating the influence of institutional distance on their ownership decisions. 
Additionally, controlling for institutional distance, I find that EMNCs with a higher level of 
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Since the 1990s, due to the rapid growth of emerging economies, emerging market 
multinational companies (EMNCs) have become important players in global business (Guillen & 
Garcia-Canal, 2009). Despite the global economic downturn, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
from emerging economies accounted for 25% of the world FDI in 2009, up from 19% in 2008 
(UNCTAD, 2010). Some of these emerging economies have become major investors; for 
instance, China, Hong Kong (China), and the Russian Federation, have become three of the top 
twenty investors in the world (UNCTAD, 2010). The majority of international research 
examining emerging economies has been focused on FDI into those countries (e.g., Hoskisson, 
Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000; Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008). Given the rising trend of outbound FDI 
from emerging economies, research examining EMNCs is particularly timely, relevant, and 
important (Mathews, 2006; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005). 
Due to their unique home market characteristics, EMNCs demonstrate very different 
patterns of internationalization than multinational firms that originated in advanced markets
1
 
(Mathews, 2002; Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). Traditionally, international scholars observed 
that firms consider seeking international expansion after they have established a solid foundation 
for their business in their home market. For example, the Uppsala model of internationalization 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) depicts that only after firms have gained substantial experience in 
their domestic market will they move on to foreign markets which are proximal to their home 
market. After they accumulate sufficient international business experience in adjacent markets, 
firms subsequently enter other less familiar foreign markets (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
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 I use the terms advanced market and developed market interchangeably throughout this paper 
to refer to EMNCs’ host, developed economies, such as the U.S., Japan, and continental 
European countries. Conversely, the terms emerging market and less developed market are used 




EMNCs, however, do not usually follow the path depicted in the traditional internationalization 
model. Because of limited resources in their home countries and latecomer status, EMNCs seek 
international expansion at an early stage (Luo, & Tung, 2007). Particularly, the less developed 
economy and weak market-supporting institutions in their home countries may limit EMNCs’ 
opportunities to develop or acquire advanced managerial or technological capabilities in their 
home markets (Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002). Thus, developed markets with well-established 
business environments become the ideal locations for EMNCs’ internationalization to enhance 
their core competencies (Makino, et al., 2002; Mathews, 2006; Wright, et al., 2005).  
To successfully achieve their goals in a developed market, however, EMNCs must 
overcome several competitive disadvantages, such as limited resources and lack of international 
experience (Mathews, 2006). Employing an institutional theoretical perspective, I analyze an 
EMNC’s competitive disadvantage by delineating their organizational legitimacy in a developed 
market. Organizational legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Organizational legitimacy is 
an especially salient issue in international business settings because multinational corporations 
(MNCs) generally face diverse legitimacy requirements from multiple institutional environments 
across the globe (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The environmental complexity facing MNCs to 
establish and maintain legitimacy in various host markets mainly comes from the institutional 
distance between the MNCs’ host and home markets (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Institutional 
distance refers to the national differences between two institutional environments (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999). Based on Scott’s (1995) framework, the institutional environment consists of 




laws that exist to ensure stability and order in societies; the normative pillar captures societal 
values and norms in the institutional field; and the cognitive pillar represents established 
cognitive structures and social knowledge shared by people in a given country (Scott, 1995).  
EMNCs, compared with other multinational firms, may encounter greater threats to their 
status as a legitimate player in a developed market given the three pillars of institutional distance. 
First, differences between the emerging market and the advanced market on the regulative pillar 
are readily visible. Formal institutions, consisting of formal rules and regulations related to all 
sorts of business dealings, are less developed in EMNCs’ home countries (Peng, et al, 2008). For 
instance, accounting standards and legal requirements surrounding listing and registration in a 
stock market (Karolyi, 1998; Marosi, & Massoud, 2008), and investor protection procedures 
(Pagano, Roell, & Zechner, 2002) all differ between emerging and advanced markets. Thus, 
EMNCs may find it challenging to establish legitimacy in a developed market if their corporate 
practices are not consistent with more rigorous regulations in a developed market. Second, in 
regard to the cognitive pillar, historically, developed markets are mainly located in North 
America and Western Europe, two areas that share substantial cultural overlap. EMNCs, on the 
other hand, are likely to be from other regions (e.g., Asia or Latin America) and will thus be 
embedded in different cultures. As such, EMNCs are likely to face substantial cultural 
differences, and thus encounter challenges to conform to the institutional pressures reflecting the 
cognitive pillar of advanced markets. Third, in terms of the normative pillar of institutional 
distance, some common practices among EMNCs are not shared with advanced-market MNCs 
(AMNCs), for example, the prevalence of family-owned business groups. Thus, well-established 




To gain legitimacy, EMNCs need to change their accustomed practices to comply with dominant 
practices in a developed market. 
Given the EMNC’s potential difficulties in establishing legitimacy in a developed market, 
I conduct a two-phase study to examine whether EMNCs base their ownership strategy on 
legitimacy concerns to expand their operations into developed markets. Determining an 
appropriate level of ownership (i.e. the extent of equity investment) in a foreign subsidiary is an 
important strategic decision regarding a firm’s international expansion (Delios & Beamish, 1999; 
Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Taylor, & Zou, S. 1998). It involves strategic decisions on 
important matters such as resource commitment, degree of control, and type of risk (Brouthers, 
1995, Delios & Beamish, 1999; Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Taylor, & Zou, 1998). 
Traditionally, entry mode researchers rely on transaction cost economics (TCE) and emphasize 
operational efficiency considerations (Brouthers & Hannart, 2007). TCE assumes information 
asymmetry and opportunism among trading parties (Williamson, 1975, 1981). The discussion of 
ownership position focuses on the premise that the increase in ownership enhances the extent of 
an investing firm’s control, but intensifies its financial risks over the foreign establishment 
(Brouthers, 1995; Brouthers & Hannart, 2007; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Anderson & Gatignon, 
1986). When entering a less familiar foreign market, a foreign investor may opt for lower equity 
participation to avoid the risks associated with the greater likelihood of a partnering firm’s 
opportunistic behaviors due to environmental uncertainty (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). On the 
other hand, without the complete control associated with full ownership, the foreign investor 
may face undue risk by working closely with a partnering firm because the partnering firm can 
readily attain the foreign investor’s intangible strategic assets through the partnership and 




Recently, researchers have gone beyond the traditional TCE approach and the associated 
assumption of partnering firm’s opportunistic behaviors. Seeking a comprehensive framework to 
analyze macro level national differences, researchers have proposed institutional theory as a 
promising perspective to advance entry strategy research (Brouthers & Hannart, 2007). For 
example, Yiu & Makino (2002) suggest that the choice of entry mode can be viewed as the 
consequence of organizational responses to isomorphic pressures arising from a firm’s external 
legitimacy requirement in the host market or internal legitimacy concern within the MNC. 
Utilizing a sample of 364 Japanese subsidiaries, they find support for the position that legitimacy 
requirements in a host market significantly affect firms’ entry mode choices above and beyond 
traditional transaction cost considerations (Yiu & Makino, 2002).  
In the current context, given the institutional distance between emerging markets and 
developed markets, I argue EMNCs’ ownership strategy would be influenced by the legitimacy 
threat facing EMNCs. To examine this issue, I conduct a two-phase examination to study 
EMNCs’ ownership position in a developed market. Specifically, this study focuses on cross-
border merger and acquisition (M&A) events in the United States, an ideal context to study 
EMNCs’ internationalization behavior. To compensate for their latecomer disadvantages, 
EMNCs have largely utilized M&As to swiftly establish their presence in developed markets 
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007). Particularly, the U.S. has had, by far, the highest 
frequency of EMNCs’ M&A events of all the advanced markets (Economist, 2011).  
In Phase One, I compare and contrast EMNCs’ ownership position in response to 
institutional distance with the ownership position of MNCs from other advanced markets 
(AMNCs). Basically, I argue that given EMNCs’ unique characteristics, EMNCs will respond to 




current study suggest EMNCs are less sensitive to institutional distance than AMNCs. For 
instance, facing normative distance, AMNCs are likely to take less ownership, while EMNCs’ 
ownership position is not influenced by normative distance.  
In Phase Two, focusing on EMNCs, I provide a more in-depth examination of the 
influence of various home country and firm characteristics on a EMNCs’ ownership position as 
well as their post-acquisition firm performance. Influenced by various levels of country 
development among emerging markets, EMNCs may have different degrees of legitimacy threat 
associated with their country of origin. The country of origin effect has been widely utilized in 
marketing literature to study how consumers’ perceptions about a product or brand are biased 
based on their perceptions associated with a particular country (Roth & Romeo, 1992). Similarly, 
lacking information related to EMNCs, developed market stakeholder may evaluate EMNCs 
based on the country level characteristics of their home emerging economies. A stakeholder 
refers to “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46). Because of EMNCs’ latecomer status in global 
business competition, EMNCs’ stakeholders in developed markets have less information about 
the firm and are likely to evaluate EMNCs based on the stereotypes associated with the country 
of origin (Bitektine, 2011). Conversely, the indicators of country development, such as human 
capital, may alleviate developed market stakeholders’ negative evaluation and differentiate one 
emerging economy from another. The findings of the current study render some support for the 
hypothesized relationship between legitimacy and various home market characteristics. 
Furthermore, various EMNCs’ firm characteristics, such as international presence and 
third-party endorsements, may alleviate the legitimacy threat associated with institutional 




between normative distance and EMNCs’ ownership position. Finally, I am interested in 
assessing the association between EMNCs’ ownership position and subsequent firm 
performance. Specifically, I offer a set of competing hypotheses to examine whether higher or 
lower ownership position improves EMNCs’ overall firm performance. The results suggest 
higher ownership position lead to better sales growth for EMNCs. 
In summary, through a multi-phase empirical examination of EMNC’s entry mode in the 
U.S., I provide evidence in regard to the influence of institutional distance on EMNCs’ 
internationalization. Given the rising phenomenon of EMNCs, the findings of this study have 
great implications for practitioners to formulate effective strategies to respond to the challenges 
facing EMNCs in developed markets. In addition, utilizing institutional theory, I contribute to the 
international business literature by comparing EMNCs’ entry mode decisions with other MNCs. 
This finding may provide a foundation for a new internationalization theory. Further, despite the 
common characteristic of a less developed economy, emerging markets can differ on several 
important dimensions. In this study, I differentiate among the levels of institutional constraints 
associated with EMNCs’ countries of origin by looking into various home market characteristics, 
such as human capital development in an emerging economy.  
Moreover, the current study may contribute to institutional theory by expanding the 
theory to examine organizational responses under multiple institutional constraints. As 
researchers point out, much of the research using institutional theory focuses on institutional 
pressure to explain the isomorphism of organizational responses in an institutional field 
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008). The current study focuses on the firm level and examines 
EMNCs’ entry mode decisions in response to competing institutional demands from their 




behave differently from AMNCs due to EMNCs’ unique characteristics. Further, EMNCs that 
originated in the same home country may have different entry mode decisions based on their 
unique firm characteristics. As such, the finding of this study aids our understanding of how 
organizations respond differently to isomorphic pressures despite being under similar 
institutional constraints. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. EMERGING-MARKET MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES (EMNCS) 
1. THE HOME BASE OF EMNCS—EMERGING ECONOMIES 
Emerging economies are not well defined in the international literature. Part of the 
difficulty in classifying a country as emerging market may be due to the rapidly changing 
landscape of foreign direct investment (FDI), which involves a firm’s cross-border transfer of 
resources by any intra-firm mode, such as joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries 
(Dunning, 1998). Just a few decades ago, most FDI originated from the so-called Triad countries, 
including the United States, continental European countries, and Japan (UNCTAD, 2006), and 
these countries constitute the commonly discussed developed markets. Due to the prevalence of 
FDI originated from developed markets, traditional research on FDI activities tracked 
multinational corporations (MNCs) from developed markets and their strategies in entering other 
developed markets and/or less developed markets (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008).  
During the 1960s, MNCs from the so-called Asian tiger economies, including Taiwan, 
South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, were among the earliest non-traditional MNCs. 
Researchers documented this first wave of non-traditional MNCs’ activities as “The New 
Multinationals” (Lall, 1983) and “Third World Multinationals” (Wells, 1983). Many of these 




some of them have since graduated to developed economies. For example, South Korea has been 
included in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), most of the 
members of which are high-income economies with a high Human Development Index (HDI)
2
 
and are considered developed countries. In the last ten years, another group of emerging 
economies, including the so-called BRICS countries (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) are considered to be the next group of newly industrialized economies having the 
potential to compete with major economies. The aforementioned groups of rising economies (the 
Asian Tigers and BRICS) are exemplar sources of major non-traditional FDI. Other emerging 
economies may include so-called Tiger Cubs (i.e. The Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia), formerly socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and the newly independent 
states of the former Soviet Union.  
The above brief documentation of the transition of emerging economies suggests as time 
changes, various unique characteristics associated with country development are utilized to 
classify emerging economies and present difficulty in having a consistent definition of emerging 
economies. In practice there is also no universal definition of which countries are considered to 
be emerging economies. The World Bank classifies countries into four income groups, using 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita as cutoff values. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) bases their classification of the advanced and emerging economies on three indicators of 
country development, including GNI per capita, export diversification and the degree of 
integration into the global financial system. UNCTAC, the statistic division of the United Nation, 
publishes a series of lists including top 100 non-financial MNCs from developing and transition 
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 HDI originated in the annual Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development 
Programme. HDI combines three dimensions, including life expectancy at birth, mean years of 






 For example, in 2008, 67 firms on the list of top 100 non-financial MNCs were from 
Asian economies, including China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, India, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand (Table 1). Despite using the term developing economies, UNCTAC, 
whose reports are frequently cited in international literature, made an effort to emphasize that the 
classification code is only for the convenience of reporting statistics and that there is no 
established convention for the classification.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Despite the various classifications, it is agreed that emerging markets are important to the 
world economy because of their rapid economic growth (Economist, 2011). In contrast with the 
recent sluggish economic growth in the developed markets, less economically developed 
countries, mostly in Latin America and Asia, continue to demonstrate impressive economic 
growth (UNCTAD, 2006). For example, the U.S. is expected to have economic growth of 2.2 
percent in 2012, while several emerging markets are predicted to grow by 15 percent. China, one 
of the major emerging economies, is expected to have 8.2 percent growth in GDP (Economist, 
2011). Moreover, newly internationalized firms from these less developed economies 
increasingly become important players in the global business landscape. Despite the recent 
global economic downturn, foreign direct investment (FDI) from emerging economies accounts 
for 25% of the world FDI in 2009. The World Investment Report suggests that FDI from 
emerging economies will continue to rise (UNCTAD, 2010).  Studies tracing the development of 
                                                          
3
 UNCTAD classifies countries into three groups of development, including developing 
economies, transition economies and developed economies. In the current paper, developing and 




these firms demonstrate the promise of these non-traditional MNCs to become an important 
avenue for theorizing or empirical testing (e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 2008; Luo, & Tung, 
2007; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005).   
Other than rapid economic growth, another distinguishing characteristic of emerging 
markets lies in their institutional environment. Institutions consist of “cognitive, normative, and 
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott, 
1995, p.33). Economists, represented by North (1991), view institutions as consisting of formal 
rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and informal restraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions, code of conduct). Extant economic research has been focused on the evolution of 
formal institutions which promote a set of economic rules of the game (with enforcement) that 
induce sustained economic growth (Assane, & Grammy, 2003; De Haan, & Lundstrom, 2006; 
North, 1991). In ancient hunting and gathering societies, simple forms of economic exchange 
were enforced by a dense social network of informal constraints, such as trust and reciprocity. As 
trade became more complex, the impersonal contract enforcement through various institutions 
became necessary, because personal ties, voluntary constraints, and ostracism were no longer 
effective (North, 1991). Similarly, as emerging markets become more competitive in the world 
economy, recent research suggests that these emerging markets will experience a transition 
process from a “relationship-based, personalized transaction structure to a rule-based, impersonal 
exchange structure” (Peng, 2003, p. 275). Along similar lines, other researchers suggest that 
emerging markets are characterized by ‘weak’ formal market-supporting institutions, such as 
their legal framework and enforcement, property rights, information systems, and regulatory 
regimes (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). Whereas market-supporting institutions are 




to ensure effective markets or even undermine markets (as in the case of corrupt business 
practices)” (Meyer, et al., 2009, p. 63). 
In sum, there is no consistent definition of emerging markets in either the academic or 
practitioner literature. At the conceptual level, the current study utilizes emerging economy as an 
umbrella term to represent countries that experience rapid economic growth, but do not achieve 
the maturity of developed markets, particularly in the development of their formal institutions. 
For empirical purposes, in Phase One, acquirers’ home countries are classified into emerging 
economies and advanced economies based on conventional standards, offered by United Nation 
and OECD association. In Phase Two, I rely on several country level characteristics to further 
delineate the country-of-origin effects on EMNC’s internationalization behaviors.  
2. EMNCS’ INTERNATIONALIZATION MOTIVES 
In the current study, I follow Luo & Tung (2007) and define emerging-market 
multinational companies (EMNCs) as “international companies that originated from emerging 
markets and are engaged in outward FDI, where they exercise effective control and undertake 
value-adding activities in one or more foreign countries” (p.482). This definition excludes firms 
which are only engaged in the exporting-importing business, and focuses on EMNCs which have 
substantial investment in foreign activities and are perceived as having influence in the eyes of 
developed market stakeholders. In this section, I will further elaborate EMNCs’ unique 
motivation to opt for accelerated internationalization, where traditional asset-exploiting 
consideration is secondary to the primary asset-seeking motivation, particularly when EMNCs 




Because of their unique home market conditions, EMNCs, considered “new” MNCs, are 
following a different path than traditional multinationals from advanced markets (Guillen & 
Garcia-Canal, 2009). Traditionally, the internationalization model based on the established 
MNCs portrays internationalization as a sequential, learning process. The Uppsala model 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) predicts that after establishing a substantial domestic base of 
operation, a firm looks for adjacent areas for expansion. Only when a firm accumulates 
substantial international business will a firm seek to enter a less familiar market (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977). This line of research has shown that psychic distance, measuring managers’ 
perceptions of cross-national differences, is a powerful predictor of a firm’s foreign target 
selection (Benito & Grisprud, 1992; Stottinger & Schlegelmilch, 1998; Whitelock & Jobber, 
2004) and entry strategy (Brouthers, 1995; Ellis, 2007). Psychic distance refers to the factors that 
prevent a firm understanding of a foreign environment (Nordstrom & Vahlne, 1994). When 
managers perceive a large distance between their home country and host location, they are less 
likely to pursue the host location as the first foreign entry. In other words, managers’ perceptions 
of risk and uncertainty associated with a less familiar market dictate a firm’s internationalization 
behavior. EMNCs, however, do not follow the exact trajectory predicted by this sequential 
process. Based on a sample of successful firms originating from peripheral countries, including 
Thailand, India and Brazil, Bartlett & Ghoshal (2000) reveal that executives of these successful 
EMNCs demonstrate two strong qualities: 1) their commitment and confidence in their firms’ 
ability to compete internationally, even before the company achieves the scale needed for 
international expansion, and 2) their willingness to accept new ideas even when those ideas 
challenge established practices and core capabilities. As a result, these adventurous business 




foundation in their home markets. Similarly, Bonaglia, Goldstein & Mathews (2007) document 
the accelerated internationalization pattern demonstrated by three successful EMNCs in the 
home appliance industry, including Haier from China, Mabe from Mexico and Arcelik from 
Turkey.  
The above discussion suggests that EMNCs differ from traditional, advanced market 
multinational companies (AMNCs) in that EMNCs internationalize at an earlier stage than 
AMNCs. The expedient internationalization process mainly results from EMNCs’ unique 
motivation for expanding overseas. Traditionally, firms seek international expansion to increase 
market share or to access low-cost factors of production (e.g. labor, raw material, etc.) (Bartlett, 
Ghoshal & Beamish, 2008). Internationalization theories suggest that to compete with 
indigenous firms in the host market, a multinational firm needs to have some ownership-specific 
advantages (i.e. strategic competencies) to counteract “the liability of foreignness” –a foreign 
firm’s cost of doing business abroad compared to an indigenous firm (Zaheer, 1995). Thus, 
substantial success in the home market is essential for the firm to be equipped with strategic 
competencies to compete abroad. When a firm successfully establishes an overseas operation to 
exploit their ownership advantages, the multinational firm can further reap the benefit of 
internationalization to enjoy economies of scale or scope (Bartlett, et al. 2008).  
The asset-exploitation motive of internationalization is further elaborated in Dunning’s 
(1980) well-established eclectic paradigm, Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) 
framework. Dunning (1980) suggests the ownership-specific (O) advantages as the first 
condition to be satisfied for a firm to benefit from internationalization. As Dunning (1993) notes, 
“These O (i.e. ownership-specific) advantages largely take the form of the privileged possession 




border value-added activities. These advantages and the use made of them are assumed to 
increase the wealth creating capacity of a firm, and hence the value of its assets” (parenthesis 
added, p. 79). Further, location (L) indicates that the distribution of these resources and 
capabilities are not evenly allocated across nations and can be specific to one nation or a few 
countries. Given these L advantages, when firms perceive it to be in their best interest to 
internally govern these advantages rather than transact them in the market place, internalization 
by establishing foreign operations is considered to be advantageous. Thus, a traditional view on 
internationalization has largely assumed the “exploitation perspective where firms make the most 
of their rent-yielding ownership advantages expanding into overseas market” (Gubbi, Aulakh, 
Ray, Sarkar & Chittoor, 2010, p. 398). 
As international researchers suggest, various motivations for firms’ internationalization 
result in different internationalization patterns and one single theory may not adequately explain 
all of the international activities (Dunning, 1980). Particularly pertinent to the research on 
EMNCs’ early internationalization behavior is the perspective that EMNCs may not possess 
firm-specific advantages prior to their pursuit of internationalization (Wood, Khavul, Perez-
Nordtvedt, Prakhya, Dabrowski, Zheng, 2011). At least, they may not possess the traditional 
conceptualization of firm-specific advantages, such as advanced technology and managerial 
capabilities (Makino, et al., 2002). Since EMNCs are less likely to possess aforementioned firm-
specific advantages, the traditionally prescribed motivation of asset-exploitation may not be the 
main motivation for EMNCs to expand overseas (Yiu, Lau & Bruton, 2007). Instead of asset-
exploitation motives, EMNCs may choose to internationalize to seek strategic competencies to 
compensate for their latecomer disadvantages (Child & Rodriguez, 2005; Rui & Yip, 2008). For 




cross-border acquisitions of established firms to acquire strategic capabilities (Rui-Yip, 2008). In 
addition, by surveying a sample of 328 Taiwanese firms, Makino, Lau, and Yeh (2002) validated 
their prediction that EMNCs are motivated to expand abroad for asset-exploiting as well as asset-
seeking purposes. Specifically, EMNCs are motivated to acquire strategic assets primarily in 
developed markets, while gaining additional market share by entering both developed and less 
developed countries (Makino, et al, 2002).  
The asset-seeking motivation is not completely omitted in the traditional discussion of 
internationalization. For example, Dunning (1993) identifies three major motives for MNC’s 
international expansion, including seeking of markets, resources, and strategic assets. The first 
two motives fit the asset-exploiting argument—by investing in a foreign location, MNCs are 
portrayed as increasing market share or reducing production cost, thus achieving scale or scope 
economies. For the third motive, seeking strategic assets demonstrates the asset-seeking 
argument that MNCs expand overseas to acquire strategic competencies which can be 
complementary to the MNC’s competitive advantages (Makino, et al., 2002). Essentially, these 
three motives can be applied to explain both AMNCs’ and EMNCs’ international activities. 
However, because of their latecomer status, EMNCs are much more motivated to acquire 
strategic assets, including traditionally conceptualized strategic assets, such as technology, 
marketing and management expertise, as well as other strategic assets, such as brands and 
distribution channels (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002). 
For instance, building on research developed in the mid-1980s related to outward 
expansion by “third world” multinationals (e.g. Lecraw, 1977, 1983; Wells, 1983; Lall, 1983), 
Lung & Tung (2007) propose a “springboard” perspective that describes the expedient pattern of 




risk-taking through aggressive M&As than established firms. Basically, due to their latecomer 
status, they are much more motivated to “use international expansion as a springboard to acquire 
critical resources needed to compete more effectively against their global rivals at home and 
abroad and to reduce their vulnerability to institutional and market constraints at home” (Luo & 
Tung, 2007, p.484). They further conclude that asset- seeking is one of the major reasons for 
EMNCs to expand overseas. Through a systematic use of international expansion, EMNCs seek 
various strategic assets to compensate for their competitive disadvantages, the strategic assets 
which traditional MNCs are not usually seeking through internationalization, such as brands and 
distribution channels (Luo & Tung, 2007).  
  Other than the strategic asset-seeking motive, researchers discuss additional factors to 
motivate EMNCs’ internationalization at an early stage. In some cases, EMNCs may utilize 
internationalization to avoid poor institutional environments in their home markets (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Witt & Lewin, 2007). For example, firms may choose to incorporate in 
countries outside their home markets to bypass tariff barriers. In other cases, EMNCs, such as 
some Chinese firms, are state-owned enterprises and encouraged by their governments to expand 
overseas to acquire the resources needed for the development of their home countries (Deng, 
2004). While the above cases suggest some unique EMNC’s motives to venture abroad, in 
general, strategic asset-seeking serves as the most compelling reason for EMNCs’ accelerated 
internationalization, particularly into developed markets. 
3. EMNCS’  COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
Given the prevalence of research on EMNC’s motivation for internationalization, less is 
known about how EMNCs can succeed in global business competition. A few pioneering studies 




flexibility and cost advantages to compete with established giants (Mathews, 2006; Wright et al., 
2005). There has not been a systematic examination of how EMNCs may address their 
competitive disadvantages while entering developed markets. In this section, I mainly review 
literature of the pioneering studies on EMNCs’ competitive advantages and explicate the urgency 
to study EMNCs’ competitive disadvantages in their expansion in developed markets. 
A few researchers have suggested that EMNCs possess both market-based and non-
market based advantages (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011; Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012). First, 
market-based advantage refers to advantages based on resources developed to compete against 
other firms in the industry (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011). EMNCs have advantages in 
providing lower cost products as well as in designing products for a niche market, particularly 
serving emerging market customers. EMNCs’ cost advantage is mainly derived from the factor 
endowment in their home country, such as cheaper labor and raw materials (Sun, Peng, Ren, & 
Yan, 2012). Since the 1950’s, lower trading barriers have encouraged foreign direct investment, 
and established multinationals have shifted their manufacturing facilities to less developed 
countries to capitalize on relatively lower wages. Low labor cost becomes the major location-
specific advantage among these less developed economies (Porter, 1990). Such a location-
specific advantage, however, is readily utilized by other firms which have operations in these 
countries, and does not constitute an EMNC’s unique competitive advantage over their 
developed-market counterparts. Built upon the location-specific advantage of low production 
cost, EMNCs primarily propel their growth through innovation which focuses on the unique 
needs of the emerging economies (Mathews, 2006). The Tata Nano, a small car with a sale price 
of around 4,000 U.S. dollars, is a great example of this type of innovation. Similarly, Mathews 




showed that Pacific Asian firms appear to be nimble, competitive players, finding niche markets 
or innovative ways to complement the incumbent multinational giants’ strategies (Mathews, 
2006).  
In combining their cost advantage and their local knowledge of serving emerging market 
customers, EMNCs can build their competitive advantage by utilizing existing technology or 
business models previously developed by AMNCs to design innovative, affordable products. 
Indeed, several researchers document that successful EMNCs build their competitive advantage 
by utilizing their connections and linkages with AMNCs (Mathews, 2006; Wright, et al., 2005; 
Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). Mathews (2006)’s Linkage-Leverage-Learning (LLL) 
framework further elaborated EMNCs’ competitive advantage of leveraging connections. Based 
on his finding that dragon multinationals did not depend on their ownership advantage for 
international expansion, Mathews (2006) revised Dunning’s (1980) Ownership-Location-
Internalization (OLI) framework. By establishing linkages (L) with AMNCs through partnership 
or acquisition, dragon multinationals developed their competitive competences by leveraging (L) 
the connections associated with AMNCs. Through the leveraging experience, dragon 
multinationals learned (L) how to compete with AMNCs by replicating the success of linkage 
and leverage. For instance, Ispat, the world’s largest steel producer, started as a small steel 
producer in Indonesia. Ispat expanded their overseas business by following its major client, GM, 
to establish their foreign operations in different parts of the world (Mathews, 2006). Originating 
from Taiwan as a PC assembler, Acer also accelerated its internationalization through a series of 
acquisitions and partnerships with established firms in various target markets and became one of 
the most successful PC components, PC, and IT firms in the world (Mathews, 2006). The above 




conceptualized ownership advantages, can still successfully venture abroad by utilizing their 
connections with AMNCs. By leveraging the connections of the established firms, EMNCs are 
standing on the shoulders of giants to achieve further development, making accelerated 
internationalization possible.  
Second, non-market advantages refer to advantages based on resources developed by the 
firm to operate in a country’s institutional environment (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011). Early 
international research studying emerging economies has been focused on the inward FDI to these 
countries (e.g. Hoskisson, et al., 2000; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). The research agenda was to 
understand how firms from developed markets may operate successfully in emerging economies 
to enjoy economies of scale or scope. Emerging economies were characterized as low in 
environmental munificence and high in environmental uncertainty because of a less developed 
economy and institutions. Institutions have been described as the “rules of the game” (North, 
1990). Without fully developed, formal market-supporting institutions, there are not many clear 
rules to follow in doing business. Thus, for a foreign firm to be successful in an emerging 
economy, the firm would need to master navigating the informal institutions, and deal with the 
uncertainty associated with changing regulations and governmental interventions (Hoskisson, et 
al., 2000). 
In contrast with the AMNCs’ potential disadvantage of lacking the capacity to deal with 
the aforementioned uncertain institutional environment, EMNCs may be in an advantageous 
position because they have the experience to cope with such uncertainty in their home markets. 
Recent studies generally support that EMNCs have better firm performance in other less 
developed markets than do established MNCs, because EMNCs are skillful in dealing with an 




Filatotchey, et al., 2005). Indeed, given the uncertainty associated with unstable institutional 
rules, EMNCs need to be equipped with great strategic flexibility to be able to excel in their 
home markets (Wright et al., 2005). Thus, successful EMNCs are credited as institutional 
entrepreneurs who can adapt easily to changing institutional rules (Caves, 1996; Lall, 1983; 
Lecraw, 1993). 
Compared to the EMNC’s ability to utilize their connections with AMNCs to create 
market-based advantages, EMNCs can also develop non-market based advantages by building 
network-ties with business groups (Wright, et al., 2005). Some researchers suggest that in a less 
developed institutional environment, informal networks substitute for formal institutions and 
reduce the environmental uncertainty associated with changing institutional rules (Gullien, 
2000).  EMNCs, originating from less developed market-supporting institutions, sustain their 
competitive advantage by forming business groups which constitute informal ties across different 
industries (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). Thus, diversified business groups, a prevailing form 
of organization in emerging economies, are believed to be substitutes for the imperfect product, 
capital, and labor market in the emerging market (Leff, 1978; Guillien, 2000). Further, EMNCs 
that have affiliations with business groups usually perform better than other independent firms in 
emerging markets (Gullien, 2000).   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 summarizes the aforementioned preliminary research on EMNC’s competitive 
advantage. Relatively limited research, however, probes their competitive disadvantages, 




rate, emerging markets are viewed as attractive locations for established MNCs from advanced 
markets (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). For some EMNCs, to survive domestically, they must 
compete effectively with established MNCs. Thus, a majority of EMNCs consider their 
investment in advanced markets as an important means to seek more sophisticated marketing, 
managerial and technological capabilities as well as brands and distribution channels (Luo & 
Tung, 2007; Makino, et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2005).  To successfully achieve their strategic 
goals in developed markets, EMNCs, however, need to overcome their competitive 
disadvantages, such as limited resources and less international experience (Mathews, 2006), not 
to mention that EMNCs may not be able to utilize their non-market advantages, which are useful 
in a nation with similar institutional environments to their home country (Cuervo-Cazurra, & 
Genc, 2008; Wan, 2005). Despite the importance of such a research inquiry, little existing 
research provides a systematic examination of EMNCs’ competitive disadvantages, particularly 
in developed markets. In the following section, I will further delineate EMNCs’ competitive 
disadvantages in a developed market through the lens of organizational legitimacy. 
B. EMNCs’ COMPETITIVE DISTADVANTAGES— CHALLENGES IN 
ESTABLISHING LEGITIMACY IN A DEVELOPED MARKET 
1. ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY AND INSITITUTIONAL DISTANCE 
A fundamental premise of institutional theory is that organizations which are isomorphic 
to their institutional fields have a greater chance of survival because such conformity grants the 
organizations political power and institutional legitimacy to exist (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
According to earlier work in sociology, organizational legitimacy refers to the congruence 
between the organizational values implied by the firms’ activities and the social values of the 




may choose to adopt specific business activities to conform to socially-constructed value systems 
so that they may gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1995). 
Suchman’s (1995) seminal work on legitimacy clearly portrays sources of legitimacy and 
proposes that to secure different types of legitimacy, organizations need to adopt various 
strategies, such as co-opting constituents, offering symbolic displays and professionalizing 
operations. Various researchers apply institutional theory and suggest that firms’ activities to 
enhance legitimacy are critical to their survival and success (e.g. Cohen & Dean, 2005; Elsbach, 
1994; Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2001). For example, by analyzing a sample of central banks, 
Deephouse (1996) found support for the central premise of institutional theory—organizational 
isomorphism increases organizational legitimacy. The results show that controlling for 
organizational age, size and performance, the banks’ isomorphism in their strategies increases 
the legitimacy conferred by bank regulators and the media (Deephouse, 1996). Further, drawing 
on a sample of U.S. firms, Cohen & Dean (2005) find that the characteristics of top management 
teams can be a signal of a firm’s legitimacy, thus increasing the firm’s values in initial public 
offerings (IPO).  
Organizational legitimacy is an especially salient issue in the international context 
because MNCs are faced with diverse legitimacy requirements from multiple institutional 
environments across the globe. Notably, Kostova & Zaheer (1999) develop an influential model 
delineating the complexity of organizational legitimacy in the context of multinational firms. 
They propose that “MNCs face at least as many different institutional environments as the 
number of countries in which they operate, since institutions tend to be country specific” 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999, p.68). Further, they propose that the environmental complexity that 




comes from the institutional distance between the host and home markets. The three pillars of 
institutional distance illustrate the different types of conformity needed to gain legitimacy. The 
regulative pillar of institutional pressure emphasizes conformity to rules and is enforced by the 
isomorphism mechanism of coercion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). The normative 
pillar stresses a deeper, moral base for assessing organizational legitimacy, which is established 
through normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). The cognitive pillar 
of institutional pressure views organizational legitimacy as the organizations’ activities 
congruent with the shared cognitive structure in a society, and this type of conformity is 
represented by mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). These three 
pillars of institutional environment thus exert qualitatively different pressures for organizational 
conformity. For example, the regulative pillar of the institutional environment consists of explicit 
rules and regulations, so the institutional pressure from the regulative pillar is easier for foreign 
organizations to understand, compared with the cognitive and normative pillars of institutional 
pressure.  
Existing empirical work illustrates the importance of analyzing legitimacy along the three 
pillars of national institutional distance (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004). For 
instance, studying a U.S. based MNC’s implementation of quality management practices, 
Kostova and Roth (2002) find that the institutional profile of the host country (i.e. three pillars of 
institutional environments, Kostova, 1997) influences the foreign subsidiary’s decision in 
adopting quality management practices. Their results demonstrate that even with strong and 
consistent support for the practice from the parent organization, subsidiary firms will implement 
the practice only to varying degrees. Basically, if a given practice is consistent with the cognitive 




such a practice (Kostova & Roth, 2002). This result also demonstrates that foreign subsidiaries 
will strategically respond to pressures from the institutional fields in the host market in an effort 
to gain legitimacy in the host market.  
A note is warranted when discussing different institutional environments. The previous 
discussion related to the three pillars of the institutional environment is based on Scott’s (1995) 
framework and widely accepted by neoinstitutional sociologists. Neoinstitutional economists, 
represented by North (1991), conceptualize the institutional environment based on two types of 
institutions, formal and informal institutions, instead of the three pillars of institutional 
environment. North (1991) defines institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interactions.” He views institutional constraints as consisting of 
formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and informal restraints (sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, code of conduct), which usually contribute to the perpetuation of order and 
safety within a market or society. In my view, North’s (1991) formal institutional rules coincide 
with the regulative pillar in Scott’s (1995) framework, while Scott (1995) further delineates 
North’s (1991) informal institutions into cognitive and normative pillars of institutional 
environment. In the current study, generally, I adopt Scott’s (1995) framework in analyzing 
institutional distance between emerging markets and developed markets. Occasionally, to 
enhance the readability of the writing, I use formal institutions to refer to the regulative pillar of 
the institutional environment. For example, one of the salient characteristics of an emerging 
market lies in its transition to develop formal institutions, which consist of sophisticated 




2. EMNCS’ LEGITIMACY IN A DEVELOPED MARKET 
EMNCs, compared to other multinational firms, may potentially encounter greater threats 
to their status as a legitimate player in a developed market. This is primarily due to the large 
institutional distance between EMNC’s host, developed market and home, emerging market. 
First, differences between the emerging market and the advanced market on the regulative pillar 
are readily visible. For instance, accounting standards, investor protection procedures (Pagano, 
Roell, & Zechner, 2002), and legal requirements surrounding listing and registration in a stock 
market (Karolyi, 1998; Marosi, & Massoud, 2008) all differ between emerging and advanced 
markets. Formal institutions, consisting of rules and regulations related to all sorts of business 
dealings, are less developed in EMNCs’ home countries (Peng, et al, 2008). Thus, EMNCs may 
find it challenging to establish legitimacy in a developed market if their original corporate 
practices are not consistent with more rigorous regulations in the developed market.    
Second, the cognitive-cultural distance between emerging markets and developed 
markets can be analogues to the difference between western and eastern cultures. Most of the 
developed markets are located in North America and Western Europe, two areas that share 
substantial cultural overlap.  EMNCs, on the other hand, are likely to be from other regions (e.g., 
Asia or Latin America) and will thus be embedded in different cultures.  As such, it is likely that 
EMNCs face large cultural differences and may thus find it difficult to conform to pressures 
reflecting the cognitive pillar of advanced markets. For example, one of Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions, individualism, captures one of the major cultural differences between the Western 
and Eastern culture. EMNCs, originating in an Eastern culture that values collectivism over 
individualism, may adopt an organizational design valuing collective effort, such as group-based 




individualistic host market, the host market employees and other stakeholders may not readily 
view these practices as legitimate. 
Third, normative pressures in regards to what is considered as best practice in the 
industry can vary between developed markets and emerging markets. Particularly, some widely 
acceptable practices among EMNCs are not commonly adopted by AMNCs. For instance, 
family-owned business groups are a prevalent form of organization among some EMNCs, such 
as Chinese and some Latin-American firms (Yeung, 2000). This practice may be derived from a 
collective culture where the family affiliation is deemed as an important criterion to earn a stake 
in the company. Established Japanese and South Korean enterprises also utilize these forms of 
business conglomerates, such as the Keiretsu (Lonien, 2007) and Chaebol (Kim, 2003), to 
efficiently expand their business landscape. Similarly, family members’ cross-holding of 
company stock among affiliated companies is observed in some European countries with a 
collectivistic culture, such as in Switzerland (Faccio & Lang, 2002), but not among U.S. firms 
embedded in an individualistic culture.  
Additionally, several common practices designed to improve the transparency of 
corporate governance in developed markets are not commonly adopted among firms in emerging 
markets. For example, the separation of ownership and control in modern, western corporations 
promotes several corporate governance practices, such as independent boards and third-party 
auditing, to improve the effective monitoring of the management (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). These corporate governance practices may be gradually 
adopted by EMNCs due to the globalization of financial markets, but these practices are not well 




Based on the above discussion of the three pillars of institutional environments, Table 3 
summarizes the threats to EMNCs’ organizational legitimacy in developed markets. The three 
pillars serve as a convenient categorization scheme to analyze national differences in institutional 
environments. The influences of these pillars on corporate practices, however, are not necessarily 
independent of one another. For instance, the ethical beliefs of a society promoting corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) may drive the cognitive categorization of which type of practice is 
considered to be socially responsible (Tang & Wang, 2011). Further, these CSR practices can 
also influence and be influenced by various governmental regulations (Williams, Lynch-Wood, 
& Ramsay, 2006). The aforementioned normative pressure associated with modern corporate 
governance is another example of the cognitive-cultural influence. Hence, I acknowledge that for 
a given predominant practice in the institutional field, the three pillars and their corresponding 
pressures may facilitate the proliferation of the practice and its isomorphism within the field. 
However, there may be a more salient pressure from one pillar than the others in a given 
organizational practice. For instance, the minimum wage requirement imposed by labor law may 
be a stronger regulative pressure for a company’s pay policy than the pressures from the 
normative and cognitive pillars.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
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C. ENTRY MODE SELECTION 
The previous section suggests that EMNCs have great needs to enhance their legitimacy 
so that they can compete effectively in developed markets. In other words, facing diverse 




responses to enhance their legitimacy in developed markets, and thereby enhance their chance of 
survival.  In the current study, an EMNC’s entry mode strategy in their cross-border merger and 
acquisition events is identified as an important strategic posture to enhance EMNCs’ legitimacy 
in a developed market. 
1. TYPE OF ENTRY MODE 
International entry mode research explores the forms of operation firms use to expand 
their boundaries overseas. Firms may choose to “enter foreign markets through contracts (with 
distributors, resource suppliers, licensees and franchisees) or by extending the firm abroad, 
setting up sales or manufacturing subsidiaries, and should they decide to set up such affiliates, 
whether they will share the ownership of such affiliates with other firms (an equity joint venture 
[JV]) or decide to keep full ownership (a wholly owned subsidiary [WOS])” (Brouthers & 
Hannart, 2007, p. 395-396). Thus, one way to categorize entry mode is based on the amount of 
equity investment. For instance, based on a sample of foreign entry activities into China between 
1979 and 1998, Pan & Tse (2000) find support for a hierarchy of entry modes. While entering a 
foreign market, firms first consider between non-equity-based modes and equity-based modes. 
Within the equity-based modes, the choice is between wholly owned operations and partially 
owned operations, while within the non-equity-based modes, the choice is between exporting and 
contractual agreements, such as licensing and franchising.  
Furthermore, some researchers suggest that equity investment, in contrast with market 
contracts, signals a form of internalization and should be considered as an expansion of a firm’s 
boundary. In other words, the equity investment involved in a JV or WOS to gain ownership of 
foreign affiliates reflects a firm’s internalization effort by establishing hierarchical forms of 




input suppliers, the contracting parties are paid ex ante. By contrast, in an equity involved 
investment, input suppliers, the partnering firms are paid ex post from the profits of the venture. 
Thus, when it is difficult to define, and costly to measure the contribution ex ante, firms may opt 
for equity investment, rather than non-equity investment, to gain either partial or full ownership 
of the entity. Both partially and fully owned operations are considered types of hierarchical form 
of foreign investment (Hennart, 2000). Extended from the above view, Brouthers & Hennart 
(2007) propose that equity-involved modes of entry can be categorized into four types based on 
two dimensions, establishment mode and ownership mode, as shown in Table 4.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Brouthers & Hennart (2007) further suggest that both partial acquisitions (i.e. acquiring 
partial ownership of an existing firm) and Greenfield JV (i.e. starting a joint equity firm from 
ground up) should be categorized as JVs as both involve a process where input providers are paid 
for their inputs through a share of the profits of the venture (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007).  As 
such, entry mode can be classified into a joint hierarchical structure (Greenfield JV and Partial 
acquisition) and a sole hierarchical structure (Greenfield WOS and Full acquisition). This 
classification has great theoretical appeal. Both forms of organizational structure share the 
common characteristics of a hierarchy, which utilizes bureaucracy to internalize market 
contracting activities. The dichotomous classification of hierarchical structures versus joint 
hierarchical structures extends the traditional TCE view on entry mode. While a sole hierarchical 
structure rises as markets fail, a joint hierarchical structure rises as both markets and sole 




2. OWNERSHIP POSITION AND NATIONAL DIFFERENCES  
 Determining an appropriate level of equity ownership in a foreign investment is an 
important international strategic decision (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Anderson & Gatignon, 
1986; Taylor, & Zou, 1998). This decision making involves important considerations such as 
resource commitment, degree of control and type of risk (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Anderson & 
Gatignon, 1986; Taylor, & Zou, 1998). Traditionally, researchers assume a continuum of 
commitment, control, and risk involved in various types of entry modes, ranging from exporting, 
market contracts (e.g. licensing and franchising), JV to WOS. Most of the early entry mode 
research relied on TCE and posited that asset specificity and information asymmetry drive firms’ 
entry mode choices. Asset specificity is defined as a durable investment which is transaction-
specific and cannot be readily deployed without a sacrifice of productive values (Williamson, 
1975). In international entry mode research, R&D intensity is usually operationalized as a main 
predictor of asset specificity (Delios & Henisz, 2000; Erramilli & Rao, 1990; Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988; Kim & Hwang, 1992). The TCE view on entry mode suggests that asset 
specificity significantly increases switching costs and predicts a high level of equity ownership. 
An increasing equity ownership may enhance the focal firm’s strategic control to mitigate the 
risks associated with its transaction partner’s opportunistic behaviors.  
TCE researchers focusing on the relationship between ownership position and national 
differences hypothesized that country risk and cultural distance are major sources of uncertainty 
(Brouthers, & Hannart, 2007). According to Williamson (1975), uncertainty is only problematic 
when it is in combination with asset specificity. When there is little asset specificity, switching 
costs are negligible so uncertainty will not significantly increase transaction costs. Such a 




as national differences intensify negotiation and monitoring challenges. Therefore, based on 
TCE, a hierarchical form of ownership structure, such as full acquisition, rather than a joint 
hierarchical form is prescribed to be a better form for entry as it mitigates the trading partners’ 
opportunistic behaviors (Willaimson, 1975, 1981).   
Such a view on national differences is somewhat simplistic. Facing greater environmental 
uncertainty, a foreign acquirer may not necessarily opt for a higher ownership position. A recent 
review suggests that national differences between the acquirer’s and target’s nations should be 
conceptualized as two types of uncertainty—endogenous and exogenous uncertainty (Ahsan & 
Musteen, 2011). Endogenous uncertainty, exemplified by cultural differences, can be overcome 
through acquisition experience (Chi, 2000; Folta, 1998; Roberts & Weitzman, 1981). In other 
words, through learning from the local partner, acquirers will be able to reduce the risks 
associated with endogenous uncertainty over time, and this learning experience becomes a firm-
specific advantage. As such, a high level of endogenous uncertainty would predict a high level of 
equity ownership. Exogenous uncertainty, such as economic volatility, however, is independent 
of the firm’s actions and can only be resolved through passive observation. Firms may choose to 
delay the decision to invest directly and passively observe the host-country environment. Thus, a 
high level of exogenous uncertainty would predict a low-control entry mode. Other research also 
indicates that when there is a large amount of uncertainty, foreign acquirers prefer lower equity 
ownership, so that they can be flexible in dealing with contingencies (e.g. Erramilli & Rao, 1993; 
Herrmann & Datta, 2002; Rajan & Pangarkar, 2000). Further, a meta-analysis has shown that 
various measures of country risk and cultural distance demonstrate a negative relationship with 
the probability of choosing a sole hierarchical (WOS) mode of entry over a joint hierarchical 




TCE is powerful in explaining firms’ behaviors built upon assumptions related to trading 
partners’ information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviors, but it is limited in conceptualizing 
environmental uncertainty in international business activities, such as the aforementioned 
difference between endogenous and exogenous uncertainty. Given the limitations of transaction 
cost explanations of entry mode, researchers have begun to derive predictions of entry mode 
using other theoretical perspectives. For example, Yiu & Makino (2002) utilize institutional 
theory and suggest that the choice of entry mode can be viewed as the consequence of 
organizational responses to isomorphic pressures arising from a firm’s need to establish 
legitimacy in the host market. Utilizing a sample of 364 Japanese subsidiaries, they find support 
that institutional theory offers additional explanatory power for foreign entry mode choice 
beyond predictions based on transaction cost theory (Yiu, & Makino, 2002). Their finding 
suggests that a JV, instead of WOS, provides Japanese MNCs’ needed legitimacy to enter 
markets with more regulative and normative pressures towards isomorphism. In other words, 
based on institutional theory, foreign acquirers may benefit from the spillover effect of the local 
partners’ legitimacy. Thus, a large institutional distance predicts foreign acquirers’ lower equity 
ownership.  
In the current study, I utilize the theoretical lens of institutional theory to analyze national 
difference based on the three pillars of institutional distance, which provides a comprehensive 
examination of national differences, including regulative, cognitive, and normative institutional 
demands. Further, based on EMNCs’ unique characteristics, I predict that EMNCs respond to 




3. EMNCS’ INTERNATIONALIZATION AND ENTRY MODE CHOICES 
As mentioned, due to their latecomer status in competing in the global economy, EMNCs 
may internationalize at an early stage to reap the benefits of owning operations overseas. First, 
some emerging economies may lack a sizable customer base (e.g. Taiwan) or sufficient 
consumers’ purchasing power (e.g. China) to sustain EMNCs’ growth. Hence, expanding 
overseas is critical for these EMNCs to achieve economies of scale or scope (Bonaglia, 
Goldstein & Mathews, 2007). Second, due to the less developed economy and transitional 
institutions in the home market, EMNCs may have limited opportunities to acquire needed 
strategic resources at home. EMNCs, thus, may benefit from acquiring additional resources in a 
foreign location (Bonaglia et al, 2007; Makino, et al., 2002). Third, EMNCs may diversify 
market risks associated with their home markets (e.g. unpredictable governmental regulations) 
by operating in a foreign location (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007). Based on 
the above reasoning, we may conclude that internationalization serves a more fundamental 
purpose than to improve performance—it may be critical for an EMNC’s survival.  
To accrue the benefits of foreign expansion, EMNCs, however, need to make a prudent 
strategic decision on entry mode. Among an array of possible entry mode options, cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are more advantageous, because foreign firms utilizing M&As 
can build a local presence quickly, overcome traditional trade barriers, and encounter fewer 
financial risks than when utilizing Greenfield investments (Datta & Puia, 1995). While outward 
FDI from emerging economies continues to increase, cross-border M&As are shown to be a 
popular entry mode among EMNCs. For example, the value of cross-border M&As undertaken 
by Chinese MNCs in 2008 was 68 billion dollars, which makes up 18% of the outward FDI from 




(Economist, 2011). Researchers have documented that EMNCs utilize a series of cross-border 
M&As to accelerate their internationalization process (Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti & Singh, 
2009). A recent comparative study reveals that Chinese and Indian MNCs utilize cross-border 
M&As to exploit their “comparative ownership advantages” (Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012). 
Building on Ricardo’s (1817) concept of comparative advantage and Dunning’s (1980) OLI 
framework, Sun et al. (2012) propose that EMNCs may utilize cross-border M&As as an 
instrument to capitalize on the factor endowments of their home economies, mainly cheap labor 
and natural resources, and thus compensate for their latecomer disadvantages. For instance, 
Chinese firms, having access to cheaper labor in manufacturing industries, tend to have intensive 
cross-border M&As in manufacturing industries, while Indian firms, having access to cheaper 
labor in service industries, tend to have intensive cross-border M&As in service industries (Sun 
et al., 2012). 
Cross-border M&A activity thus provides an ideal context to study EMNCs’ legitimacy 
in a developed market because 1) it is a prevalent entry mode for EMNCs; 2) there is substantial 
equity involved in M&A events, so EMNCs’ decisions to enter the developed market are likely 
to be a planned action rather than a trial, short-term decision. Given the increasing numbers of 
EMNCs, a few studies have focused on predicting EMNCs’ entry mode. As shown in Table 5, 
most research on EMNCs’ internationalization activities utilized a sample of firms originating 
from a single emerging economy (except for Aybar & Ficici, 2009 and Malhotra, Sivakumar, & 
Zhu, 2011). For instance, Chinese firms are shown to prefer wholly owned subsidiaries to seek 
strategic assets and rely on joint ventures to expand market share (Cui & Jiang, 2009). Turkish 
firms prefer joint ventures over wholly owned subsidiaries while entering a market with great 




to utilize high-control entry mode when locating their investments in parts of China with greater 
social, cultural and economic linkages (Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse & Lien, 2007).  
These pioneering studies showcased country-based differences across EMNCs from a 
few emerging markets. A logical next step will be to utilize a greater sample of EMNCs from 
various emerging economies to conduct a systematic examination of EMNCs’ 
internationalization behavior. In the current study, I apply institutional theory to offer a 
systematic examination of whether EMNC’s ownership position and subsequent firm 
performance in cross-border M&A events are influenced by institutional distance.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4. CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
As globalization advances, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBAs) have become a 
particularly important entry mode for firm’ internationalization (Gubbi, et al., 2010). Worldwide 
M&A activity reached a record of $4.5 trillion in announced deals in 2007, a 24% increase over 
the previous year. Among all M&As worldwide, CBA accounted for 47 % of transactions in 
2007 (Platt, 2008). Despite their popularity, CBAs often fail (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993). 
Recently, KPMG reported that only 17% of international acquisitions accomplished pre-
acquisition performance expectations. 
Even though CBA events have been examined using several financial and strategic 




meta-analysis suggests that commonly considered factors, such as relatedness of business and 
payment methods, do not significantly explain the performance of CBA events (King, Dalton, 
Daily, & Covin, 2004). Organizational researchers have contributed to this issue by examining 
cultural difference as a major hurdle for the integration of two entities, which may substantially 
determine post-acquisition performance. In domestic acquisition events, cultural clashes were 
shown to increase administrative difficulty (Sales & Mirvis, 1984) and feelings of discomfort 
and hostility (Buono et al., 1985). Add to this, the differences in culture at the national level and 
it is clear that these differences may be a major determinant of CBA success or failure.  
Based on Hofstede’s (1980) influential framework on national cultural dimensions, 
cultural distance has become the most commonly employed measure of national difference in 
CBA studies. Findings of the relationship between cultural distance and firm performance 
remain equivocal (Reus, & Lamont, 2009; Stahl, & Voigt, 2005). While some studies reported 
negative effects of cultural distance on the performance of CBAs, other studies suggested that a 
large cultural distance leads to enhanced acquisition performance (cf. Stahl & Voigt, 2005). Reus 
& Lamont (2009) propose that cultural distance is a “double-edged sword”, which may impact 
the performance of a CBA in both positive and negative ways. Specifically, they find that 
cultural distance is negatively associated with acquisition performance through the mediating 
effects of inferior integration caused by low understandability and communication between 
acquirer and target (Reus & Lamont, 2009). Conversely, cultural distance provides potential 
synergy benefits for the combined entity by tapping diverse knowledge and resources in two 
countries. The more dramatically different the acquirer and target are from each other, the greater 




may not be realized, and cultural distance can pose a serious challenge to the ongoing 
performance of the combined entity. 
As latecomers to the global business landscape, EMNCs are particularly lacking in 
international experience and expertise in cross-cultural management. Thus, integration may 
become a major obstacle for them to accrue the benefits of synergy expected after merger and 
acquisition events. According to a recent study on EMNCs’ M&As events between 1991 and 
2004, while 60% of EMNCs’ acquisition targets are located in emerging economies, the 
remainder of the targets are in developed economies (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). In this study, on 
average, the announcement of most cross-border expansions in developing markets led to value 
destruction of EMNCs’ stock performance, while EMNCs’ acquisitions in developed markets are 
associated with positive stock market reaction (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). In addition, several 
factors appear to improve the market reaction to EMNCs’ decision on overseas expansion 
through M&A, such as the extent of equity participation (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). In the next 
chapter, I further illustrate that EMNC’s ownership position can be an important contributing 
factor to the success of CBA events, which ultimately leads to an EMNC’s superior long-term 
firm performance. 
III. THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
Given an EMNC’s potential difficulty in establishing legitimacy in developed markets, I 
conduct a two-phase study to examine whether EMNCs’ ownership decision is influenced by 
institutional distance. Specifically, this study focuses on EMNCs’ ownership position, the 
percentage of acquired stake in cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) events. As shown in 
the conceptual framework depicted in Figure 1, the three pillars of institutional distance between 




competitive disadvantage—providing challenges for EMNCs to establish legitimacy in 
developed markets. To address these challenges, EMNCs may formulate their ownership 
strategy, taking into account institutional distance, to enter the developed market and 
subsequently enjoy better firm performance.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In Phase One, I compare and contrast whether EMNCs and AMNCs opt for different 
ownership positions in response to institutional distance. EMNCs and AMNCs, both of which 
are foreign acquirers entering a developed market, are susceptible to legitimacy threats rising 
from the institutional distance between their home and host markets. Due to EMNCs’ unique 
motivation for internationalization—seeking strategic resources in the developed market, 
EMNCs may respond to such legitimacy threats differently than their counterparts. Further, the 
three pillars of institutional distance may also result in differential pressures on AMNCs and 
EMNCs.  Thus, I examine whether EMNCs and AMNCs experience these institutional pressures 
differently. In Phase Two, moving beyond the comparison between AMNCs and EMNCs, I 
focus solely on EMNCs. In the first step, I examine whether several emerging market 
characteristics may influence EMNCs’ acquired stake in the developed market. Emerging 
markets are not homogeneous in their country development, so several important indicators of 
country development, such as human capital development, may differentiate EMNCs’ need for 
legitimacy. In the second step, focusing on individual EMNCs, I further account for specific firm 
characteristics, such as international experience and market position, which can mitigate the 




institutional distance and EMNC firm characteristics, subsequently influences EMNCs’ firm 
performance.  
A. PHASE ONE: EMNCS VS. AMNCS 
1. COMPARING EMNCS’ AND AMNCS’ OWNERSHIP POSITION 
According to institutional theory, an organization’s conformity to institutional pressures 
grants organizations legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1991) and 
legitimacy is important to organizational survival and success (Cohen & Dean, 2005; Elsbach, 
1994; Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2001). Strategically, organizations utilize multiple means to signal 
their legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Based on the practices of traditional, established MNCs, 
recent studies suggest that by sharing ownership with local firms, foreign acquirers can 
effectively mitigate their threats to establishing legitimacy in the host market (Brouthers, 2002; 
Yiu, & Makino, 2002). By contrast, few studies have systematically examined EMNCs’ entry 
mode, particularly EMNCs’ ownership position in cross-border M&As. Based on EMNCs’ 
unique characteristics, I argue that EMNCs may choose different entry strategies than do 
AMNCs. In the following section, I will first examine AMNCs’ ownership position and then 
predict EMNCs’ ownership position. 
Based on past literature, AMNCs are expected to opt for a smaller equity share while 
entering a target market with larger institutional distance (e.g. Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Herrmann 
& Datta, 2002; Rajan & Pangarkar, 2000). Specifically, by venturing with a local partner in the 
host market, the foreign firm can mitigate the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995, 343). 
Institutional distance constitutes a major source of liability of foreignness, which results in three 
major competitive disadvantages for foreign firms, including unfamiliarity hazard, relational 




foreign firm’s lack of host-market knowledge (Eden, & Miller, 2004). For example, a local bank 
may have a better sense in regard to the central bank’s actions in lowering interest rates than a 
foreign bank (Zaheer, 1995). Unfamiliarity hazard may be overcome by a foreign firm with 
operational experience in the host market, but entering the host market with a local partner who 
can readily provide host-market knowledge may efficiently alleviate unfamiliarity hazard 
(Makino, & Delios, 1996). 
Second, relational hazard refers to organization costs, in terms of both coordinating 
within the firm and with constituents outside the firm (Eden & Miller, 2004). The extant TCE 
literature suggests that a foreign firm may face relational hazards coming from external or 
internal constituents’ potential opportunistic behaviors under conditions of information 
asymmetry and bounded rationality (Buckley & Casson, 1998; Henisz & Williamson, 1999). 
Even without the constituents’ intentional opportunism, a foreign firm may encounter difficulty 
in smoothly completing intra-firm and inter-firm transactions in the host market. A foreign firm 
is at a disadvantage in effectively communicating with host market constituents due to the 
diverse values, beliefs and worldviews resulting from the cognitive and normative pillars of 
institutional distance (Kostova, 1997). Thus, the relational hazard facing a foreign firm comes 
from the lack of innate host-cultural knowledge needed to monitor host-market constituents’ 
potential opportunistic behaviors as well as to reconcile diverse values and beliefs. A local 
partner, who is embedded in the host institutional environment, may provide effective 
monitoring and constant facilitation of daily operations to enhance coordination within the firm 
and outside the firm.   
Third, discriminatory hazard refers to the discriminatory treatment inflicted on the 




(1997) suggest that the host-country stakeholders’ unfamiliarity with the foreign firm may result 
in stereotypes and higher standards being imposed on foreign firms. By partnering with a local 
firm, a foreign firm can benefit from the “spillover effects” of the local firm’s legitimacy in the 
host market by sharing the local firm’s reputational capital, which resides in the local network 
(Yiu & Makino, 2002). Thus, having a local partner with a certain level of equity participation 
can help alleviate the host market stakeholders’ concern about the foreign acquirers’ legitimacy.  
In sum, in sharing ownership with a local partner, AMNCs may effectively and 
efficiently alleviate unfamiliarity, relational, and discriminatory hazards resulting from the 
liability of foreignness associated with institutional distance. Thus, I expect that in facing larger 
institutional distance, AMNCs will opt for a smaller ownership position to mitigate the 
disadvantages associated with liability of foreignness.  
H1: For AMNCs, institutional distance, including regulative distance (H1a), 
cognitive distance (H1b), and normative distance (H1c), is negatively associated 
with their ownership position in a cross-border merger and acquisition event in a 
developed market. 
The hypothesized negative relationship between institutional distance and ownership 
position, however, may not hold true for EMNCs due to their unique motivation to enter 
developed markets as well as their potential large deficit of legitimacy in developed markets. 
First, a recent review suggests that MNC’s motives for market entry are an important yet 
understudied predictor of entry mode (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Such a case can be made 
particularly for EMNCs’ entry into developed markets. To compensate for their latecomer 




managerial and marketing knowledge (Makino, et al., 2002). As such, a developed target market 
with greater institutional distance may have potentially significant learning benefits for EMNCs. 
For instance, a large normative institutional distance between the home and host market indicates 
a large difference in business practices, so EMNCs may improve their strategic competence by 
adopting the best practices in the developed market. This learning benefit has been termed a 
synergy effect in the cross-border M&A literature (Eun, Kolodny, & Scheraga, 1996; Larsson, & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Stahl & Voigt, 2008). Such a synergy effect may be particularly salient for 
EMNCs. For instance, a recent study suggests that an Indian firm may increase its value through 
international acquisitions because the firm can acquire tangible and intangible resources that are 
both difficult to acquire through market transactions and challenging to develop internally 
(Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 2010). Further, such value creation is greater when 
Indian firms enter developed markets, where target firms are more likely to carry higher quality 
resources and thus provide stronger complementarities to Indian firms’ existing capabilities 
(Gubbi, et al., 2010).  
To fulfill their strategic goals in developed markets, EMNCs may need substantial 
control over the foreign entity (Demirbag, Tatoglu, & Glaister, 2009). The transfer of tacit 
technological know-how particularly requires an extensive coordination effort between the 
sending and receiving parties (Teece, 1977). A sole hierarchical structure has superior efficiency 
over other forms of organization structure in transferring tacit knowledge across borders (Kogut 
& Zander, 1993). Therefore, to successfully transfer the acquired strategic assets to other 
subunits, EMNCs may opt for a high level of control, denoted by a high ownership position 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). An opposing argument can be made by 




suggest control can also be exercised through non-ownership mechanisms such as formal 
contracts, management teams and other informal control mechanism (Beamish & Banks, 1987; 
Yan & Gray, 1994). However, EMNCs that have limited resources and less international 
experience may not be skillful in utilizing these non-ownership control mechanisms (Demirbag, 
et al., 2009). Therefore, to successfully transfer acquired strategic assets, EMNCs have a 
propensity to seek large ownership positions to effectively exercise substantial formal control.  
Second, ownership position does not only indicate degree of control but also the level of 
partner involvement (Kogut, 1988; Makino & Delios, 1996). Due to their large deficit in 
legitimacy, EMNCs may simply not be able to find local partners who are willing to share 
ownership (Mulok, Raja & Ainuddin, 2010; Sim & Pandian, 2003). In the marketing literature, 
country-of-origin effects have been utilized to refer to the degree to which generalization and 
perceptions about a country influence an actor’s judgment of that country’s products and/or 
brands (Lampert & Jaffe, 1996; Roth & Romeo, 1992). Similarly, in the current context, EMNCs 
are likely to bear additional liability of foreignness due to country-of-origin stereotypes 
associated with the less developed economy of their home country. For instance, a Chinese piano 
maker found it difficult to enter the U.S. market because customers are reluctant to purchase 
Chinese made pianos due to the low quality stereotype associated with products made in China. 
To overcome consumers’ stereotypes, this Chinese firm acquired a German piano brand and 
marketed its products strictly under the German brand (Peng, 2009).  
Due to the country-of-origin stereotype, EMNCs may not have an egalitarian stand in 
cross-border deal negotiations and need to pay above market value to offset the liability. For 
instance, a recent study suggests that compared to their developed-market counterparts, EMNCs 




2010). Given the greater challenges that EMNCs face compared to AMNCs, sharing ownership 
with a local firm may not be a feasible option for EMNCs to overcome their liability of 
foreignness as discussed in H1a. 
Based on the above reasoning related to EMNCs’ strategic motivations and country-of-
origin liability, I expect that the negative association between institutional distance and equity 
ownership suggested for AMNCs does not apply to EMNCs. Instead, there will be a positive 
association between institutional distance and ownership position. 
H2: For EMNCs, institutional distance, including regulative distance (H2a), 
cognitive distance (H2b), and normative distance (H2c), is positively associated 
with their ownership position in a cross-border merger and acquisition event in a 
developed market.  
2. DIFFERENT PRESSURES OF THE THREE PILLARS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
DISTANCE 
The institutional literature suggests that institutional pressures from each of the three 
pillars may influence the isomorphism of the institutional field and corporate strategies 
differently (Busenitz, Gomez, & Spencer, 2000; Kostova, 1997; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002). For instance, by analyzing a sample of Japanese MNCs and their subsidiaries 
located across 44 host countries, Xu & Shenkar (2002) found that regulative and normative 
distances are negatively related to the percentage of equity ownership and expatriate staffing. 
Thus, they conclude that MNCs may choose to lower their ownership and expatriate staffing to 




Along similar lines, I expect that the three pillars of institutional distance affect the 
corporations’ need for legitimacy differently, and thus place differential isomorphic pressures on 
their entry mode choices. For example, compared with the cognitive and normative pillars of 
institutional environments, the regulative pillar, consisting of regulations and laws, is more 
explicit than social values and norms, and thus presents less difficulty for foreign firms to 
understand (Kostova, & Zaheer, 1999). In addition, regulative pillars of institutional pressure are 
enacted through rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities in a society (Scott, 1995). 
The interpretation of regulative institutional demands is usually controlled by a centralized 
enforcement mechanism, such as a governmental judicial system, so foreign firms simply need to 
follow one set of rules to become compliant with regulative institutional pressures. After all, in 
developed markets, regulatory institutions are generally well developed. Thus, regulative 
institutional rules in a developed market are often clearly set and applied to all relevant 
organizations in a consistent manner.  
On the other hand, the normative and cognitive pillars of institutional pressures do not 
have the coercive enforcement power carried by regulatory institutions. Without the restrictive 
constraints from the regulatory body, organizations have more discretion when responding to 
such institutional pressures (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996). As such, it takes more time and effort 
for foreign firms to learn the specifics of cognitive and normative institutional demands. In 
addition to understanding institutional pressures, foreign firms will also need to allocate 
extensive resources to be compliant with cognitive and normative institutional pillars. For 
instance, Kostova & Zaheer (1999) discuss one of Cargill’s projects in India and suggest that 
Cargill was able to deal with the more explicit regulatory requirements related to environmental 




from the shared fear among Indian farmers that their cooperation would become the first step 
toward a “new colonization” of India by the West (Dewan, 1994). Therefore, they concluded that 
compared to the regulative pillar, the cognitive and normative pillars of the institutional 
environment present greater challenges for a foreign firm in establishing legitimacy (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1997).  
Given the above discussion of the nature of the three pillars of institutional pressures, we 
can see that foreign firms face greater challenges associated with the cognitive and normative 
institutional distance in establishing legitimacy. Thus, MNCs’ decisions on ownership position 
are less likely to be influenced by the institutional distance of the regulative pillar when 
acquiring a foreign target in a developed market. Particularly, for AMNCs, to comply with 
regulative institutional rules in another developed market may only require minor adjustments to 
original daily operating procedures because AMNCs have learned to operate in an institutional 
environment with sophisticated business regulations in their home country. In some cases, 
AMNCs may not need to adjust their original operational procedures, if the host, developed 
market does not place more restrictive regulative pressures on the AMNC than the AMNC’s 
home market. For instance, a German firm entering the U.S. market may face less regulative 
pressure to adjust its environmentally friendly procedures to conform to the U.S. standard, since 
the firm is accustomed to operating in an institutional environment with stringent environmental 
protection regulations. Therefore, I expect that among the three pillars of institutional distance, 
the regulative pillar has the weakest association with AMNCs’ ownership position in cross-




H3: For AMNCs, the effect of the regulative pillar of institutional distance on 
ownership position has the least influence among the three pillars of institutional 
distance.  
Compared with AMNCs’ operational experience in their home, developed markets, 
EMNCs are not as accustomed to following well-developed regulative institutional rules. For 
EMNCs, the development of additional organizational routines is required to become compliant 
with extensive, more sophisticated business regulations and rules. Recent research suggests that 
EMNCs are not universally disadvantaged in competing with other MNCs in various institutional 
environments (Cuervo-Cazurra,  & Genc, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra,  & Genc, 2011). Accustomed 
to operating in a weak market-supporting institutional environment in their home markets, 
EMNCs have an advantage in utilizing their experience to deal with uncertainty in another 
country with a similar institutional environment (Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 2008; Cuervo-
Cazurra, & Genc, 2011).  By contrast, when EMNCs enter a dissimilar institutional environment, 
such as the one in developed markets characterized by well-defined, market-supporting 
institutional rules, EMNCs cannot effectively utilize their existing non-market based advantage, 
and need to develop additional organizational routines to respond to more sophisticated, complex 
institutional demands (Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 2011). For instance, advanced capital markets 
are more stringent in evaluating the quality of information provided; a complex political system 
with more extensive political rights and civil liberties requires firms to be more sophisticated in 
responding to multiple stakeholders’ potentially competing demands (Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 
2011). Thus, the regulative pillar of institutional distance may not be easily overcome by 




In addition, compared to the cognitive and normative pillars of institutional distance, 
regulative institutional distance represents a large, readily observable difference between 
developed markets and emerging markets. Extant finance and economic research on emerging 
market characteristics centers on the inefficiency of the market mechanism, such as a lack of 
transparency and high levels of corruption, in emerging economies (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 
2007; Klapper, & Love, 2004). Much less discussion has been focused on the non-regulative 
institutional environments of emerging markets. Thus, most of the developed market 
stakeholders’ negative evaluations of emerging markets may come from differences in the 
regulative pillar of institutional distance rather than the other two pillars. In other words, the 
institutional distance of the regulative pillar may become a more salient country-of-origin 
stereotype of emerging markets for developed market stakeholders than the other two pillars. In 
addition, the cognitive and normative pillars of institutional distance, such as national cultural 
difference, may only be viewed as differences between countries, and are less likely to be 
associated with the negative evaluation of EMNCs’ country of origin (Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 
2011). Therefore, for EMNCs, regulative institutional distance presents larger challenges to 
establishing legitimacy in developed markets.  
In sum, EMNCs may not readily overcome regulative institutional distance because of 
EMNCs’ lack of experience in complying with more sophisticated business-related institutional 
rules as well as considerable country-of-origin stereotypes associated with the regulative 
institutional environments of EMNCs’ home, emerging economies. Therefore, I expect that the 
regulative pillar of institutional distance has a stronger association with an EMNC’s ownership 
position than other two pillars. The positive association between institutional distance and 




H4: For EMNCs, the effect of the regulative pillar of institutional distance on 
ownership position is the strongest among the three pillars of institutional 
distance.  
B. PHASE TWO: EMNCS’ OWNERSHIP POSITION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
In Phase One, EMNCs were treated as a homogeneous group to contrast with AMNCs’ 
when considering internationalization behavior. In Phase Two, moving beyond the comparison 
between EMNCs and other MNCs, I focus on EMNCs to further delineate whether various home 
market and firm characteristics influence EMNCs’ ownership position and subsequent firm 
performance. First, salient home market characteristics, including human capital development, 
global connectedness, and historical connections to the host market, are selected to differentiate 
one emerging market from another. Second, firm characteristics, including market leading 
position, international presence, media coverage and stock market cross-listing, differentiate one 
EMNC from another EMNC originating from the same emerging economy.  
1. EMNCS’ HOME MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
As discussed earlier, EMNCs encounter greater liability of foreignness, which emanates 
from the country-of-origin stereotypes associated with their home, emerging economies. These 
country-of-origin effects have been shown to influence important firm strategies and outcomes, 
such as product positioning strategies and resulting product performance (Roth & Romeo, 1992; 
Samiee, 1994). Product performance generally decreases when consumers’ perceptions of the 
product are negatively impacted by the country of origin effect (Roth, & Romeo, 1992). Recent 
studies suggest that an EMNC’s stock performance in its initial public offering (IPO) in a 
developed market can also be influenced by the investors’ perception of the EMNC’s country of 




specific information related to EMNCs, foreign investors in the developed market utilize the 
country level characteristics of the EMNCs’ home emerging economy as information cues to 
determine whether to invest in EMNCs’ IPOs (Bell, Moore, & Filatotchev, 2012; Bell, Moore, 
Al-Shammari, 2008). Thus, unfavorable impression of EMNC’s home economy, such as lacking 
a sophisticated auditing system, is carried over to evaluate EMNCs unfavorably. 
The aforementioned country-of-origin effect can be further explained through the social 
categorization process in individual level research. Social categorization theory (Tajfel, & 
Turner, 1985) suggests that to reduce uncertainty, individuals tend to categorize other individuals 
into social groups and interpret these individuals’ behaviors according to the features of the 
social groups. Thus, each individual is often evaluated either based on his or her social category 
membership (e.g. gender or ethnicity), or his or her personal attributes (e.g. personalities or 
abilities). When social category memberships (e.g. a person’s gender and ethnicity) are readily 
visible features, individuals may rely on social categorization process to expedite the cognitive 
processing of the information related to the individual (Tajfel, & Turner, 1985). Stereotyping, 
and subsequent discrimination behaviors, occurs when social actors rely heavily on the social 
category membership to evaluate an individual without taking into account an individual’s 
personal attributes (Elsass, & Graves, 1997; Dovidio, & Hebel, 2005).  
Similarly, studies of the country-of-origin effect (see review in Samiee, 1994) support 
that consumers sometimes rely on perceptions of country of origin (a social group) to evaluate a 
product with less consideration for the product attributes. Particularly, in the context of 
international business decisions, corporate purchasing managers are shown to be influenced by 
their country-of-origin perception in their sourcing decisions among suppliers across the globe, 




consumer’s buying decision on a product (see review in Anderson & Chao, 2003). Along similar 
lines, developed market stakeholders considering EMNCs’ entry mode into developed markets 
may evaluate EMNCs unfavorably when they apply stereotypes associated with emerging 
economies, such as low product quality, to evaluate EMNCs’ legitimacy. In other words, the 
stereotyping effect further explains the aforementioned EMNCs’ challenges to find a local 
partner who is willing to share ownership with. 
Building on the findings of stereotyping process, I propose several home market 
characteristics can alleviate EMNCs’ challenges to form partnership with a local firm. The 
stereotyping process has been studied as an individual’s schematic processing (e.g. Locksley, 
Borgida, Brekke, & Hepburn, 1980; Kulik, Bainbridge, Hugh, & Cregan, 2008). Schema refers 
to mental representations of knowledge regarding a specific domain, such as the stereotypical 
beliefs associated with a social category (Fiske, & Taylor, 1991). Schematic processing requires 
less time and effort (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Two contingencies may alleviate the likelihood of an 
individual’s automatic schematic processing. First, stereotyping processing is reinforced by the 
match between the focal individual’s characteristics and the social actor’s prototypes of the traits 
and behaviors of a certain social category (e.g. stereotypical beliefs) (Kulik, et al., 2008). On the 
other hand, when the social actor recognizes that discrepancy exists between the focal individual 
characteristics and his or her stereotypic beliefs, the social actor is often motivated to engage in a 
more deliberate cognitive processing route to resolve such discrepancies, and thus, is less likely 
to stereotype the focal individual (Kulik, et al., 2008). In the current context, I propose that 
human capital development in an emerging economy serves as an important indicator of the 




for developed market stakeholders. Hence, developed market stakeholders are less likely to 
stereotype EMNCs, originating from an emerging market with high levels of human capital. 
Second, schema researchers also found that individuating information (e.g. personal 
attributes) decreases social actors’ tendency to judge an individual based on stereotypical beliefs 
associated with a social category (Locksley, et al. 1980; Locksley, Hepburn, Ortiz, 1982a; 
Locksley, Hepburn, Ortiz, 1982b). When individuating information is available, social actors are 
more likely to utilize individuating information rather than the stereotypes (Locksley, et al. 1980; 
Locksley, et al., 1982a; Locksley, et al., 1982b). In the current context, I argue that an emerging 
nation’s global connectedness and historical connection with the host market suggests the extent 
to which the developed market stakeholders have individuating information about the nation, 
thus decreasing the likelihood of attributing stereotypes to evaluate EMNCs’ legitimacy. In a 
latter section, I will elaborate on how global connectedness and historical connections may 
enhance developed market stakeholders understanding of the emerging nation as an individual 
nation rather than as a member of emerging economies.   
a) HUMAN CAPITAL 
Historically, MNCs often relocate their manufacturing plants to less developed countries 
to exploit both cheaper labor as well as less rigorous labor standards (Porter, 1990). But skilled 
labor is harder to come by in these countries due to lower levels of economic development and 
reduced opportunities for education. Consequently, MNCs have traditionally mass produced low-
end, labor-intensive products in less developed countries and produced parts and products which 
require greater technology and skilled labor in advanced countries (Porter, 1990). Because of the 
unskilled labor force, products manufactured in these less developed countries have traditionally 




as being of poor quality and only after several electronics brands, such as Samsung and Goldstar, 
began seeing success in the global marketplace did the perceptions of South Korean products 
improve (Holt, Quelch, & Taylor, 2004).   
Due to cheaper labor and inferior infrastructure, EMNCs may be plagued with country-
of-origin stereotypes that are associated with mass-produced, cheap quality products. On the 
other hand, human capital development in an emerging economy, including skilled labor and 
innovative capacity, may alleviate the developed market stakeholders’ negative evaluation. A 
nation’s innovative capacity refers to a country’s progress in producing and commercializing 
innovative technology over the long term (Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002). Human capital, 
including skilled labor and innovative capacity, may provide the stock of a capable labor force 
and advanced technology in a nation which may propel economic growth (Romer, 1986). Human 
capital availability in a nation does not only increase the amount of FDI, but it also brings more 
upstream FDI activities into these host markets (Dunning, 1998).  
Particularly, human capital in an emerging market has been shown to attract foreign 
direct investment into an emerging economy (Pourshahabi, Mahmoudinia, & Soderjani, 2011). 
Human capital development in an emerging nation thus may serve as an effective indicator that 
the stereotype associated with low product quality does not match with the characteristics of the 
focal emerging nation. As discussed above, due to this cognitive discrepancy, individuals are less 
likely to attribute stereotypes to such an emerging nation. Therefore, EMNCs, originating from 
an emerging market with more human capital, are less likely to be influenced by the developed 
market stakeholders’ negative evaluation on their legitimacy. For instance, the innovative 




challenges to establish legitimacy in a developed market. As such, the legitimacy threat 
associated with institutional distance is mitigated. 
H5: Human capital development in an EMNC’s home country moderates the 
relationship between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position 
such that human capital development, including skilled labor (H5a) and 
innovative capacity (H5b), decreases the influence of institutional distance on an 
EMNC’s ownership position in a developed market. 
b) GLOBAL CONNECTEDNESS 
Global connectedness refers to the ability of resident individuals and companies to 
interact and exchange information with other parts of the world (Berry, Guille´n, & Zhou, 2010). 
Global connectedness, usually operationalized as the extent of internet coverage in a nation, has 
been a particularly important concept in the studies of online commercial activities (Oxley & 
Yeung, 2001) and economic growth (Lucas, 1993, 2002). These studies suggest that countries 
with greater global connectedness are in a better position to integrate in the global community, 
increasing the information exchange between the country and the world. Further, a country may 
strengthen its innovative capacity through the integration of global knowledge, subsequently 
experiencing economic growth (Lucas, 1988, 1993). Thus, global connectedness can be 
considered to be a source of a nation’s competitive advantage. For instance, through a large 
volume of international trade, emerging nations, such as the BRICS countries, may provide an 
environment in which domestic firms are accustomed to competing with other international 
firms.  
Specifically, in the context of contemplating the stereotypes associated with emerging 




EMNCs. As discussed earlier, greater country-specific information availability motivates social 
actors to engage in deliberate cognitive processing based on country-specific information rather 
than the stereotypes associated with emerging economies. Thus, an emerging nation well 
connected with the global community is more likely to be known as an individual nation rather 
than a member of emerging economies. In addition, an emerging nation’s image can be improved 
because the country may be granted a high status through global connectedness which indicates 
the nation’s competitive advantage (Lucas, 1988, 1993). For instance, through a high level of 
global connectedness, emerging economies, such as the BRICS countries, are more likely to be 
known as emerging nations with great potential to compete with advanced economies.  
H6: The global connectedness of an EMNC’s home country moderates the 
relationship between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position 
such that the global connectedness of an EMNC’s home country decreases the 
influence of institutional distance on an EMNC’s ownership position in a 
developed market. 
c) HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS TO THE HOST DEVELOPED MARKET 
In contrast with global connectedness, which describes general connections with a global 
community, historical connection denotes a specialized tie with the host market. The historical 
connections may be formed through colonizer-colonized link, common language, common 
religion, and common trade block membership, etc. The historical connections indicate 
interaction history between two countries at some point in time. For instance, Christian 
missionaries have purposefully gone into remote areas in the world to improve local education, 
literacy, social justice, and economic development (Lakina, & Getachew, 2012). While 




emerging economies and cultivated important human capital for the emerging economies 
(Lankina, & Getachew, 2012).      
The historical connection is stronger when the emerging nation has multiple connections 
with the host developed market. For instance, even though English is commonly used in India, 
Indian firms may have a closer tie with the British culture than with American culture because of 
the additional colonizer-colonized link with the British. An emerging nation’s historical 
connection to the host developed market may alleviate a EMNCs’ legitimacy threat in a couple 
of ways. First, EMNCs, originating from emerging nations with historical connections, have 
greater understanding of the host developed country, thus having better capability to overcome 
the liability of foreignness, such as unfamiliarity hazard (Eden & Miller, 2004). Second, 
developed market stakeholders may view emerging nations with historical connections in a more 
positive light than other emerging economies. The historical connections may foster a sense of 
proximity and encourage developed market stakeholders to view such an emerging market as 
more similar than different from the developed nation. In the internationalization literature, 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975, p.308) have famously used the British Commonwealth 
as an example to illustrate that previous colonial links can alleviate business managers’ concerns 
of the negative impacts of geographic distance on efficient international operations. In the 
previous example, India and the United Kingdom may seem to be far apart geographically but 
are often viewed to share some common features because of the previous colonial link (Dow & 
Karunaratna, 2006). 
H7: The historical connections of an EMNC’s home country to the host developed 
market moderates the relationship between institutional distance and an EMNC’s 




country decreases the influence of institutional distance on an EMNC’s ownership 
position in a developed market. 
2. EMNCS’ FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
a) EMNCS’ FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND OWNERSHIP POSITION 
Based on previous discussions, a shared ownership control may grant foreign firms 
needed legitimacy in the host market. Institutional distance, a major threat to establishing 
legitimacy in the developed market, does not equally impact all EMNCs. Several firm 
characteristics may signal EMNC legitimacy, which should be factored into their consideration 
of ownership strategy. Referencing the institutional literature, researchers have recently 
suggested that EMNCs may signal their legitimacy in two important ways—through 
organizational capabilities and the validation by third-party institutions (Ivanova, & Castellano, 
2010).  
First, organizational capabilities can be resources or competencies (Johnson, Scholes, & 
Whittington, 2005). Possessing fewer resources in relation to their counterpart AMNCs, EMNCs 
may demonstrate their competencies through their performance as indicated by a market leading 
position and international presence. Suchman (1995) notes that an organization’s immediate 
constituents may judge the organization’s legitimacy based on a pragmatic calculation of an 
organization’s activities. In the context of CBA events, an EMNC may prove its worthiness as a 
partner by demonstrating its competence. For instance, Asus is a multinational computer 
hardware and electronics company headquartered in Taiwan. Asus started out as a motherboard 
manufacturer for Intel and successfully built its leading position in the PC component market by 
leveraging its connection with Intel. After Intel recognized Asus’ superior engineering capacities 




processors and other computer components for Intel, despite competition from many other 
established PC manufacturers, such as IBM (Bushell-Embling, 2009). Ever since, Asus has 
become one of the major global players for laptop and hand-held device. In a case like this, Asus 
has proven itself through its leading position in the industry, so its legitimacy will be less likely 
to be questioned in a developed market. 
H8: The extent of an EMNC’s market leading position moderates the relationship 
between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that an 
EMNC’s market leading position decreases the influence of institutional distance 
on its ownership position in a developed market. 
The level of international experience, both general and target-country specific, has been 
widely discussed in entry mode literature (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Kogut & Singh, 1988). 
An EMNC’s familiarity with the region of the target market and international business in general 
may enhance their ability to identify good investment opportunities, reduce information 
asymmetry, and alleviate the liability of foreignness (Harzing, 2002; Martin, Swaminathan, & 
Mitchell, 1998). While fewer EMNCs have a worldwide presence than AMNCs, EMNCs present 
in multiple foreign locations are in a better position to alleviate the legitimacy threat associated 
with institutional distance than EMNCs with only a few foreign locations. 
H9: An EMNC’s international presence moderates the relationship between 
institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that an EMNC’s 
international presence decreases the influence of institutional distance on its 




Second, in addition to EMNCs’ demonstration of organizational capabilities through their 
market leading position and international presence, EMNCs may utilize third-party endorsements 
to mitigate the threat to their legitimacy. Bitektine (2011) reviewed various conceptualizations of 
organizational legitimacy and suggested a long-standing method for organizations to improve 
stakeholders’ evaluation of an organization’s legitimacy was through the organization’s linkages 
with highly legitimate social actors in its environment. In the context of CBA events, the local 
media plays an important role in bolstering an EMNC’s legitimacy in a developed market by 
providing positive coverage (Rottig, & Reus, 2009). Particularly, in the U.S., popular news 
magazines, such as BusinessWeek and Forbes, periodically track the development of emerging 
markets. They may provide immediate access for developed market stakeholders to evaluate a 
EMNCs’ past performance. Thus, media coverage from these popular magazines can effectively 
improve the public’s impression of an EMNC’s reputation and thus improve its legitimacy 
(Rottig, & Reus, 2009).  
H10: Media coverage of an EMNC moderates the relationship between 
institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that media 
coverage in a developed market decreases the influence of institutional distance 
on its ownership position in a developed market. 
Additionally, a potentially effective way for EMNCs to alleviate their stakeholders’ 
concerns is by cross-listing their shares in a stock market in a developed market, such as in the 
U.S. The cross-listing premium, the higher market return of listed foreign firms versus non-listed 
foreign firms, has been well documented in the finance literature (Karolyi, 1998; Pagano, Roell, 
& Zechner, 2002). Basically, through the endorsement of a powerful government agency or 




dominant practices in the field, such as adhering to more stringent accounting standards (Pagano, 
et al., 2002). For example, for foreign firms to list on U.S. exchanges, they must comply fully 
with GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) reporting and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulations, which typically require a higher level of disclosure than most 
international accounting standards (Karolyi, 1998). In other words, these firms are under 
rigorous monitoring of their financial reports, and thus may improve the transparency of their 
corporate governance. As a result, stakeholders of the foreign firms may be encouraged to view 
these foreign firms as legitimate players in their business. Particularly, EMNCs may benefit 
greatly from such an endorsement to alleviate their country-of-origin stereotype, resulting from 
less rigorous, unsophisticated business regulations in their home countries.  
H11: An EMNC’s cross-listing in a developed market moderates the relationship 
between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that an 
EMNC’s cross-listing in a developed market decreases the influence of 
institutional distance on its ownership position in a developed market. 
b) EMNCS’ OWNERSHIP POSITION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Pioneering research on EMNC’s internationalization suggests that developed markets 
provide an ideal location for EMNCs to acquire strategic assets to compensate for their latecomer 
disadvantages (Makino, et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2005). Empirically, studies on EMNCs’ CBA 
events demonstrate that an EMNC’s acquisition of target firms in developed markets receives 
positive reactions from the stock market (i.e. cumulative abnormal returns). Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, 
Sarkar, & Chittor (2010) conducted an event study of 425 CBAs by Indian firms during 2000-
2007 to support their prediction that EMNCs’ acquisitions of target firms in more advanced 




event study but examine a broader sample of 433 CBA announcements associated with 58 
EMNCs during the sample period of 1991-2004. Their results show that EMNCs’ CBA events, 
on average, lead to value destruction (i.e. lower firm abnormal returns), while acquisitions 
involving targets that are located in culturally distant and economically developed markets lead 
to higher firm value. 
Given the initial evidence of investors’ positive reactions towards EMNCs’ CBA events 
in developed markets, I further probe the association between the EMNCs’ ownership position 
and subsequent firm performance. In the CBA literature, post-acquisition performance is 
considered related to the success of integration between two entities (Slangen, 2006; Stahl, & 
Voigt, 2008). Post-acquisition integration involves combining people, resources, and activities 
from two entities into one organization. Based on Hofstede’s cultural distance dimensions, CBA 
researchers find inconsistent effects of cultural distance on firm performance after acquisitions. 
Some studies suggest that cultural distance is negatively associated with firm performance 
(Datta, & Puia, 1995; Francis, Hasan & Sun, 2008), while other studies supported the view that 
the performance of CBAs is enhanced if the acquirer and the target come from culturally distant 
countries (Eun, Kolodny, & Scheraga. 1996; Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005; Chakrabarti, 
Gupta-Mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2009). Recently, a few researchers have suggested that the 
mixed results occurred because there are both positive and negative effects of national cultural 
differences (Stahl & Voigt, 2008; Slangen, 2006; Reus, & Lamont, 2009). The positive effects 
come from the diverse knowledge and resources provided by a large national cultural difference 
between the acquirer and the target. CBAs provide the acquirer with access to a diverse set of 
routines embedded in national cultures (Barney, 1986; Hofstede, 1980; Kogut & Singh, 1988; 




larger the national cultural differences between the acquirer and the target, the harder it is to 
integrate the two entities due to incompatible organizational practices, which are largely 
influenced by national cultures (Weber et al., 1996). As Chakrabarti et al. (2009) posited, 
“Cultural difference may enhance the potential synergies of a merger, particularly through 
capability transfer, resource sharing and learning, but only at the cost of increased integration 
challenges.” Thus, to increase CBA performance, the acquirer needs to improve integration by 
minimizing the obstacles of post-acquisition integration. In turn, this will allow for the 
realization of greater synergy originating from a larger cultural difference between the acquirer 
and the target (Stahl & Voigt, 2008). 
Above all, EMNCs’ ownership position may influence the success of post-acquisition 
integration and subsequent firm performance. Taking into consideration institutional distance, 
EMNCs may formulate their ownership position to alleviate legitimacy threat in a developed 
market. The EMNCs, opting for lower ownership position, would have a better chance to 
navigate post-acquisition challenges by counting on their local partners, thus enjoying better firm 
performance. However, a counter argument can be made based on EMNCs’ primary motivation 
to enter developed markets. Seeking complimentary strategic assets, EMNCs may fulfill their 
goal to compensate for their latecomer disadvantages only when they can successfully transfer 
these acquired strategic assets back to other units of EMNCs. Based on the rationales provided in 
Hypothesis 2, EMNCs may need dominant control in the acquired entity to ensure the transfer of 
strategic assets. Thus, a high ownership position may be more effective in contributing to overall 
firm performance. As such, a set of competing hypotheses is provided below to assess the 




H12a: Controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs with a higher ownership 
position experience better post-acquisition overall firm performance. 
H12b: Controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs with a lower ownership 
position experience better post-acquisition overall firm performance. 
C. SUMMARY 
Given the rising phenomenon of EMNCs, the current study intends to provide an in-depth 
examination of a practical strategic issue facing EMNCs. To successfully compete with AMNCs, 
developed markets are attractive locations of foreign entry for EMNCs to acquire strategic assets, 
which may compensate for their latecomer disadvantages in global competition. However, to 
fulfill their strategic goals, EMNCs need to make prudent decisions on their entry strategy to 
address the challenges of establishing legitimacy in developed markets. Through a multi-phase 
empirical examination of EMNC’s ownership position in a developed market, I provide evidence 
to demonstrate how institutional distance impacts an EMNC’s chance of success in a developed 
market.  
In Phase One, I consider how EMNCs may formulate their ownership position differently 
from other MNCs given the potentially larger institutional distance between EMNCs’ home and 
host markets. In general, a large institutional distance may lead a foreign firm to consider taking 
less ownership to enjoy the spillover effects of the local firm’s legitimacy. However, this 
prediction of a negative association between the institutional distance and equity ownership may 
differ for EMNCs for a couple of reasons. First, EMNCs, seeking to transfer learned practices 
from the developed market to the rest of its organization, may prefer a higher percentage of 




(Makino & Beamish, 1998). Second, due to their large deficit in legitimacy, EMNCs may simply 
not be able to find local partners who are willing to share ownership. Therefore, based on the 
above two explanations, I expect that the anticipated negative association between institutional 
distance and equity ownership does not exist for EMNCs. Instead, there may be a positive 
association between institutional distance and full equity ownership. 
Furthermore, the various dimensions of institutional distance may place differential 
isomorphic pressures on their entry mode choices. The regulative pillars of institutional distance 
are most easily understood (Kostova, 1997) and thus present less difficulty for foreign firms to 
establish legitimacy than the cognitive or normative pillars of institutional distance. Thus, for 
developed MNCs, I propose that the regulative pillar will have a weaker association with entry 
mode than the cognitive or normative pillars. However, such predictions may not hold true for 
EMNCs for two reasons. EMNCs may not readily overcome regulative institutional distance 
because of EMNCs’ lack of experience in complying with more sophisticated business-related 
institutional rules as well as considerable country-of-origin stereotypes associated with the 
regulative institutional environments of EMNCs’ home, emerging economies. Therefore, I 
expect that the regulative pillar of institutional distance has a stronger association with an 
EMNC’s ownership position than other two pillars.  
In Phase Two, moving beyond the comparison between EMNCs and AMNCs, I focus on 
a sample of emerging market firms to delineate how EMNCs’ specific home market and firm 
characteristics influence their entry mode choices, and subsequently, their firm performance. 
First, not all emerging markets are homogeneous. Emerging markets may vary in their degree of 
human capital development, global connectedness, and historical connections with the host 




market stakeholders’ perceptions of EMNCs’ legitimacy. As a result, EMNCs from various 
countries of origin may have different degrees of need for legitimacy. Second, according to the 
recent discussion about organizational agency, firms are believed to be able to position 
themselves differently within similar institutional fields. In the current context, firm level 
characteristics, including the EMNCs’ market leading position, global presence, media exposure, 
and cross-listing in the developed market, are hypothesized to mitigate the effect of institutional 
distance on their ownership positions. Thus, the threat of legitimacy is not equally salient to all 
EMNCs from the same emerging market. Furthermore, ownership decision is suggested to 
influence post-acquisition performance. On the one hand, a shared ownership control may 
enhance EMNCs’ legitimacy in the developed market, thus contributing to better performance. 
On the other hand, a dominant control may enhance EMNC’s ability to transfer acquired 
strategic assets, thus leading to better performance. Thus, a set of competing hypotheses is 
offered to investigate the performance implication of EMNCs’ ownership position. Table 6 
summarizes the above proposed hypotheses. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, I discuss the research methodology used to test the hypotheses developed 
in Chapter 3. This chapter provides a detailed description of the sample, a discussion of the 
dependent and independent variables, as well as an overview of the statistical methods used to 





The sample of the current study includes all of the foreign firms that made cross-border 
acquisitions in the United States during the sampling period (noted below). This data was 
acquired through the Thomson SDC Platinum database. The U.S. market is a particularly ideal 
location to study EMNCs’ cross-border acquisitions for two reasons. First, besides the relatively 
stable investment environment, the U.S. has very few restrictions on foreign investment, so 
foreign firms generally have great discretion in making entry mode decisions to respond to 
institutional pressures (Goodrisk & Salancik, 1996). Second, the U.S. market is by far the most 
popular developed market for EMNCs’ cross-border M&A activities (Economist, 2011). Thus, I 
can capture the greatest amount of variance of EMNCs’ internationalization patterns in the U.S. 
market using this approach.   
The sampling period is from 2005 to 2011, which includes the year of the beginning of 
the global financial crisis, 2008.  By observing activity during this period, I have the opportunity 
to control for the impact of the global financial downturn on internationalization for AMNCs and 
EMNCs. In addition, variables measuring home market characteristics are more widely available 
after 2005
4
 which allows me to test my hypotheses more fully by examining more variables 
associated with emerging markets. 
Financial firms are excluded from the sample as they are usually subject to regulations 
and laws that other firms are not subject to (Doidge, et al., 2007). In addition, it should be noted 
that different samples are used for the two phases of the examination. While in Phase One, I 
include all cross-border M&A events from both AMNCs and EMNCs in the sample, in Phase 
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 A portion of the data used for the institutional distance measure is collected through the Global 
Competiveness Report, which encompasses more countries and more survey items after the year 




Two, I only include EMNCs as a subsample for analysis. The subsamples, AMNCs and EMNCs, 
are created based on a dummy variable to classify the acquirers’ nation into advanced markets 
and emerging markets. (“1” indicates emerging markets and “0” indicates developed market). 
This classification is developed using the member countries of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and developed countries in the classification offered by 
United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The OECD is comprised of 
34 highly industrialized member countries and such a classification has been used in past 
literature (e.g. Gubbi et al., 2010). Additionally, UNCTAD publishes their worldwide economic 
statistics based on a list of developed, transitional, and developing economies, which have been 
utilized by researchers in sorting countries into developed or emerging markets as well (e.g. 
Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 2008). These two classification criteria have slight inconsistencies, in 
which some of the OECD countries are not listed as developed economies in the UNCTAD 
classification and vice versa. To reconcile the classification difference, in the current study, 
countries are classified as developed markets only when the country meets both criteria—OECD 
member countries and developed markets in UNCTAD classification. This creates a 
classification with inter-rater reliability (Saal, Downey, & Lahey, 1980) between two well-
established agencies in relation to international business. My initial search generated 1288 cross-
border M&A events. The acquirers’ country of origin is shown in Table 7.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 





B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
OWNERSHIP POSITION. The dependent variable for all of the hypotheses except for 
H12a&b is the acquirers’ ownership position, measured as the percentage of the acquired stake 
in the target firm. Data for this variable is obtained from the Thomson SDC Platinum database. 
In past entry mode research, while some researchers treat ownership position as a continuous 
variable (e.g. Hannart, & Reddy, 1997; Malhotra, Sivakumar, & Zhu, 2011), others used a 
dichotomous variable classifying ownership position into full acquisitions (95% or higher) and 
partial acquisitions (any acquired stake less than 95%) (e.g. Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Yiu, & 
Makino, 2002). In the current study, I opt for treating ownership position as a continuous 
variable for two reasons. Theoretically, any arbitrary dichotomizing method may create artifacts 
and mask a meaningful relationship. In addition, treating the data as a continuous variable often 
generates greater power to detect statistical relationships (Fitzsimons, 2008).  
FIRM PERFORMANCE. The last hypotheses in Phase Two (H12a & H12b) predict 
EMNCs’ firm performance, which is measured in multiple ways. I include an accounting 
measure of firm performance, return on assets (ROA), as well as total sales (revenue). This data 
is obtained from Worldscope Datastream database. The change in sales revenue and ROA in a 
three year window (years 1-3) after the acquisition year is constructed as the dependent variable. 
As shown in the equation below, the change in sales is calculated by using the firm’s total sales 
in the year of the acquisition as the base year of comparison. (t refers to the year of acquisition, 
and i refers to 1, 2, and 3 years.) The change in ROA is calculated in the same manner. 
                
                             
            
 
Focusing on investor reaction, the aforementioned two previous studies on EMNC’s 




very short window of time after the announcement of the M&A event (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; 
Gubbi et al., 2010). Alternatively, I collect 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year lagged stock market 
performance data for a supplemental analysis. The construction of dependent variables is similar 
to the equation above, except replacing sales data with stock performance data. Also, the base 
data is the year end data prior to the acquisition to account for the stock market’s reaction to the 
acquisition event. 
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE. As discussed above, institutional distance is analyzed 
along the three pillars of institutional environment, including regulative distance, cognitive 
distance, and normative distance. Theoretically, each of the three pillars of institutional distance 
captures meaningful national differences. Thus, the three pillars of institutional distance are 
treated as three separate dimensions and entered in the regression analysis as three separate 
predictors. 
The measures of each pillar of institutional distance are described below. First, the data 
for regulative distance is collected from the Index of Economic Freedom, offered by the 
Heritage Foundation. Economic freedom is a widely discussed concept in the economics 
literature and it is designed to capture the degree of governmental policies in place to promote 
market efficiency (Gwartney, 1996). According to the Heritage Foundation, economic freedom 
refers to the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution or 
consumption of goods and services (O’Driscoll, Feulner, & O’Grandy, 2003).  The Heritage 
Foundation has tracked and published an Index of Economic Freedom for 184 countries since 
1995 (Johnson & Sheehy, 1996).  A single index value of economic freedom has been widely 




Ficici, 2009). Regulative distance is calculated as the difference between the index values for a 
given country and the United States (the host country).  
Second, normative distance is obtained from the Global Competiveness Report published 
by the World Economic Forum. The World Economic Forum and its associate institutes conduct 
annual surveys among business executives in 153 countries. The survey items are aimed at 
capturing the competitiveness of a nation’s business environment. In the past, data from this 
report has been utilized by various researchers to construct institutional distance measures (Chao 
& Kumar, 2010; Xu, Pan & Beamish, 2004). Considering the survey items utilized in previous 
research, I generate a list of survey items pertaining to normative institutional distance. These 
survey items tap into conventional corporate practices in each nation and are included in Table 8. 
Further, for each acquiring firm’s home country, I aggregate the data of survey items from the 
Global Competitiveness Report to generate a summation score for the normative pillar of the 
institutional environment. As such, normative distance is the difference between the values for a 
given country and for the United States. The Crobach’s alpha of country scores on these eight 
survey items across multiple years in the sample period ranges between .945 and .963. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Third, in the past, institutional researchers tended to omit testing the cognitive pillar of 
institutional environment for a couple of reasons. First, it overlaps with the traditional 
conceptualization of cultural distance (Yiu & Makino, 2002), so the cognitive pillar of 
institutional distance may not provide additional explanatory power beyond cultural distance, 




multinational firms. However, the current study is aimed at understanding EMNCs’ 
internationalization activities, which have not been widely studied utilizing cultural distance. 
Second, both the cognitive and normative pillars of institutionalized practices are highly 
influenced by national cultures, so researchers assume that the normative pillar of the 
institutional environment encompasses the influence of the cognitive pillar. Thus, some 
researchers have concluded that the cognitive pillar does not need to be studied separately or is 
beyond the scope of their studies (Chao & Kumar, 2010; Xu, Pan & Beamish, 2002). As 
discussed in the literature review, EMNCs potentially encounter distinct threats along these three 
pillars of the institutional environment, and developing a better understanding of the cognitive 
pillar may help capture significant challenges that EMNCs have in establishing legitimacy based 
on national cultural differences. While regulative distance captures the difference in country 
development of regulatory institutions, normative distance represents the difference in 
predominant corporate practices across nations. Cognitive distance, represented by cultural 
distance, reflects the national culture difference between acquirers’ home markets and host 
market. Therefore, I include a measure of cultural distance in the current study to study the effect 
of the cognitive pillar of institutional distance.  
The data for cognitive distance is obtained through Hofstede’s website which has updated 
country scores for five cultural dimensions, including individualism, uncertainty avoidance, 
power distance, masculinity, and long-term orientation
5
 (e.g. Malhortra et al., 2011). Further, to 
account for the difference in the variance of each dimension, Kogut & Singh (1998) have utilized 
a composite index to represent cultural distance. This calculation of cultural distance has been 
widely adopted among cultural distance researchers (e.g. Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; 
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 Note that long-term orientation is a recently added dimension of Hofstede’s cultural distance, 




Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Cho & Padmanabhan, 1995) and will be utilized in the current 
study to calculate cognitive distance. The calculation of a composite index will be determined as 
follows: 
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   ,   
where     stands for the value for the ith cultural dimension and jth country,    is the variance of 
the value on the ith cultural dimension, u indicates the United States, and                    
is  the cultural distance of the jth country from the United States. This equation takes into 
account the variance of each dimension, thus standardizing the influence of each dimension on 
the final composite index of cultural distance. Also, note that the composite index, produced by 
squaring the difference score between two countries, does not carry the directionality of the 
difference between the raw scores of two countries. It is a theoretically appealing way of 
deriving cultural distance as it does not have implications for “more” or “less” (better than or 
worse than), but instead indicates the differences in national cultures (Cuervo-Cazurra, & Genc, 
2011).  
HUMAN CAPITAL. The indicators of human capital development include skilled labor 
and innovative capacity. Data representing these two measures is obtained from the Global 
Competitiveness Report. Skilled labor (Crobach’s alpha ranges between 0.91 and 0.92 across 
sample period) is measured by four items and innovative capacity (Crobach’s alpha ranges 
between 0.93 and 0.95 across sample period) is measured by five items. Both measures are on a 
7-point scale and items are listed in Table 9. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 





GLOBAL CONNECTEDNESS. This construct is measured by two items, including the 
percentage of internet users to total population, as well as the foreign market size of a country. 
Internet usage captures the global connectedness of information flow while foreign market size 
represents the global connectedness of commercial activities. The data for internet users is from 
the International Telecommunication Union. The data for the foreign market size is ranked by 
the World Economic Forum on a 7-point scale (7=best) based on the value of exports of goods 
and services in a country. Given the distinct meanings and measurements of these two indicators, 
Internet usage and Foreign market size are entered as separate predictors in the regression 
analysis. 
HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS TO THE HOST DEVELOPED MARKET. The construct 
is measured by three items, including common language, common major religion, and common 
trade block membership. The data for common language and common religion are measured as 
language distance and religion distance between the EMNCs’ home country and the host 
market, the United States, where the main language is English and the predominant religion is 
Christianity. The data for language distance and religion distance are collected from Dr. 
Douglas Dow’s database, hosted by the Melbourne Business School’s website.
6
 Dr. Dow 
included multiple sources and constructed religion distance and language distance between pairs 
of countries to aid his research on the stimuli of psychic distance (e.g. Dow & Karunaratna, 
2006; Dow & Larimo, 2009). Table 10 illustrates the distance from acquirer’s home countries to 
the U.S.  
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The variable common, current trade block membership is measured by a dummy variable, 
free trade agreement; “1” indicates that EMNC’s home country has a free trade agreement with 
the U.S., while “0” indicates that EMNC’s home country does not have a free trade agreement 
with the U.S. Due to conceptual and scale differences among these three indicators of historical 
connection, religion distance, language distance, and free trade agreement are entered as 
separate predictors in the regression analysis.   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 About Here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
MARKET LEADING POSITION. This variable is constructed by using total sales divided 
by average industry sales in the acquisition year. Individual firm sales data is obtained from the 
Worldscope Datastream database. Given that industry sales data is not widely available for many 
emerging economies, average industry sales is calculated based on total sales of all of firms with 
the same first digit of the SIC code in the sample.  
INSTITUTIONAL PRESENCE. Referencing past researchers’ measures of international 
experience (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Kogut & Singh, 1988) and considering the particular 
context of the current study, I create this measure by counting the number of geographic regions 
in which the firm has sales activities. Thus, the variable is essentially a measure of geographic 
dispersion of EMNCs’ sales activities. The data is obtained through the Worldscope Datastream 
database in which a firm can have as many as ten geographic segments of sales.  
 Media coverage. Given the relatively rare media coverage on EMNCs, I use a dummy 




Forbes, Fortune, and BusinessWeek, prior to the acquisition events (“1” indicates “yes”, and “0” 
indicates “no”). The data is collected through LexisNexis Academic search. 
 CROSS-LISTING. This measure is a dummy variable (“1” indicates “yes”, and “0” 
indicates “no”) to indicate whether the firm lists its stock in major stock exchanges in the United 
States. The data is obtained through a company search of the EDGAR database, maintained by 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In the current study, EMNCs are classified 
as cross-listing in the U.S. when they list their stocks on NASDAQ and the New York Stock 
Exchange as well as having American Depositary Receipt (ADR) issues in the United States. 
CONTROL VARIABLES. Firm size and R&D intensity have been shown to influence 
corporate strategy including international expansion strategy, so these two variables are included 
as control variables. Firm size indicates the firm’s operational experience, and may enhance 
managerial learning in evaluating contingencies related to entry mode decisions (see the review 
of acquisition research in Barkema & Schijven, 2008). Firm size is measured by the total assets 
of a firm prior to the acquisition. R&D intensity has been used by various researchers to measure 
firm competence as well as asset specificity, both of which may influence entry mode strategy 
(Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Due to the lack of data on EMNCs’ R&D expenses, I create a 
dummy variable as a proxy, high tech industry, to indicate whether the acquiring firm is in a high 
tech industry (“1” indicates “yes”, and “0” indicates “no”) and has the propensity to heavily 
invest in R&D. Data for the aforementioned measures is obtained from Thompson SDC Platinum 
and Worldscope Datastream databases. In addition, geographic distance, which may 
significantly increase communication and transportation costs, has been widely discussed in 
entry mode research (Berry et al., 2010) and is included as a control variable. The data for 




distance (orthodromic distance) between two countries according to the coordinates of the 
geographic center of the countries (Berry et al., 2010).    
D. ANALYSIS 
POWER ANALYSIS. In the past, research on the effect of cultural distance on entry mode 
suggests an effect size of 0.06 (Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russel, 2005). Based on power analysis, to 
achieve a desired statistical power of 0.8 in conducting a hierarchical regression of 10 predictors, 
I need a minimum sample size of 223 (Soper, 2012). Given the final sample size of merger and 
acquisition events (N=1650 for the phase one sample; N=497 for the phase two sample), I should 
be able to detect meaningful statistical relationships. 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING. The tests of the hypotheses related to ownership position are 
conducted by using multivariate regression in SPSS. In Phase Two, to test the moderation effects 
(i.e. H4-H11), I use centered variables to create interaction terms to help avoid multicollinearity. 
All of the VIF values are below 10 in the regression analysis of the interaction effects. Thus, the 
influence of multicollinearity on the statistical relationship should be limited (Aiken & West, 
1991).  
In terms of the last set of hypotheses related to firm performance, two-stage least-square 
regressions are utilized. Since previous hypotheses suggest that various measures of institutional 
distance influence EMNCs’ ownership position, the relationship between ownership position and 
firm performance can be better modeled by controlling for these influences of institutional 
distance on ownership position. Two-stage least-square regression models can provide such an 
optimal identification (Angrist & Krueger, 2001).  In the first stage, the three pillars of 




position. In the second stage, the computed values of ownership position are entered to predict 
firm performance. The analysis is conducted using SPSS 17.0. 
V. RESULTS 
A. PHASE ONE: EMNCS VS. AMNCS 
1. COMPARING EMNCS’ AND AMNCS’ OWNERSHIP POSITION 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 11 and Table 12 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 The mean, standard deviation, and correlation among the main variables used in Phase 
One are reported in Table 11. In Phase One, I predict that while institutional distance is 
negatively related to an AMNC’s ownership position, it is positively related to an EMNC’s 
ownership position. As suggested in Table 12, the acquirer’s home country status significantly 
moderates the associations between the normative pillar of institutional distance and the 
acquirers’ ownership position. In other words, AMNCs and EMNCs differ in their ownership 
position in response to normative institutional pressures, but do not differ in their ownership 
position in response to the other two pillars of institutional pressure. To further probe the 
moderation effect of the acquirers’ home country status (i.e. emerging markets or advanced 
markets), I plot the interaction as shown in Figure 2. As suggested in Figure 2, facing larger 
normative distance, AMNCs tend to adopt a lower ownership position while such a trend is not 
demonstrated among EMNCs. The simple slope tests further reveal that the downward trend of 
AMNCs’ ownership position is significant (β=-1.35, p<0.001), while the slight upward trend of 





Insert Figure 2 and Table 13 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
To further examine the differential effects of the three pillars of institutional distance, I 
conduct separate regression analyses for the subsamples of EMNCs and AMNCs. The subsample 
analysis results, shown in Table 13, demonstrate the aforementioned differences among EMNCs 
and AMNCs in responding to institutional distance. None of the three pillars of institutional 
distance is significantly related to EMNCs’ ownership position. For AMNCs, cognitive distance 
and normative distance are negatively related to AMNCs’ ownership position, while regulative 
distance does not have a significant association with their ownership position. Associating the 
above results related to the first two sets of hypotheses, I find that H1b and H1c are supported 
while the rest of the hypotheses, including H1a, H2a, H2b, and H2c, are not supported. 
2. DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES OF THE THREE PILLARS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE 
To extend the analysis, I conduct post-regression coefficient difference tests within each 
subsample to examine whether the three pillars of institutional distance have differential effects 
on ownership position (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). A series of paired coefficient 
difference test among the three pillars of institutional distance suggests no statistically significant 
differential effects in the subsample of EMNCs. By contrast, for AMNCs, as predicted, the 
regulative pillar has the weakest effect on AMNCs’ ownership position among the three pillars 
of institutional distance. Thus, H3 is supported while there is no support for H4.  
B. PHASR TWO: EMNCS’ OWNERSHIP POSITION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
According to Table 13, the non-significant results across the three pillars of institutional 




thus lacking power to detect a significant statistical relationship. To enlarge the sample size, I 
collected additional data through Worldscope Datastream, which is known to have more 
comprehensive coverage of EMNCs. After merging data with SDC data of EMNCs’ acquisition 
events, the sample size increases to 497 cross-border acquisition events conducted by 337 
EMNCs, originating from 36 emerging economies. Table 14 shows the break-down of 
acquisition events by country of origin and by acquisition year. The descriptive statistics and 
bivariate correlations among the main variables in Phase Two are reported in Table 15.  
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 14, Table 15 and Table 16 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Table 16 demonstrates the association of the three pillars of institutional distance on 
EMNCs’ ownership position based on the enlarged sample.  According to Table 16, the cognitive 
pillar of institutional distance is consistently negatively associated with EMNCs’ ownership 
position and is the only pillar with a significant association among the three pillars of 
institutional distance. Thus, as indicated in Phase One, the empirical results do not support the 
positive association between the three pillars of institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership 
position, which was suggested in H2a-H2c. Among the three pillars of institutional distance, only 
cognitive distance shows a significant negative association with ownership position, whereas 
regulative and normative distances do not seem to associate with the EMNCs’ ownership 
position.  
1. EMNCS’ HOME MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
The first set of hypotheses in Phase Two deals with country-of-origin stereotypes, which 




United States. Three types of EMNC home market characteristics are hypothesized to weaken 
such stereotyping effects, thus mitigating the association between institutional distance and 
EMNC ownership position. H5 suggests the degree of human capital development in an 
emerging economy, measured by skilled labor and innovation capacity, may weaken this 
association. According to Table 17, the extent of skilled labor in the EMNCs’ home country 
moderates the association of regulative and normative distances with an EMNC’s ownership 
position. The extent of innovation capacity moderates the association between cognitive distance 
and EMNCs’ ownership position. Further, the main effect of the regulative pillar becomes 
positive as hypothesized in H2a, while the main effect of cognitive distance remains negative. 
The main effect of normative distance is not significant.  
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 17 and Figures 3-5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Figures 3-5 further illustrate the directionality of the moderation effect. H5a & H5b 
suggest that the indicators of human capital development decrease the main effects of 
institutional distance on EMNCs’ ownership position. The empirical evidence partially supports 
the above assertion. Figure 3 suggests that facing larger regulative distance, EMNCs from 
countries with low levels of skilled labor tend to take higher ownership positions (as illustrated 
by a significant simple slope (β=1.15, p=0.01)), while such a relationship does not exist when 
EMNCs are from countries with higher levels of skilled labor (β=-0.13, p=0.5).  Likewise, this 
weakening effect of the presence of skilled labor on the effect of institutional distance is 
observed in the association between normative distance and the EMNCs’ ownership position. As 




skilled labor tend to take higher ownership positions (as illustrated by a simple slope, significant 
at 0.1 level (β=2.7, p=0.07)), while such a relationship does not exist when EMNCs are from 
countries with higher levels of skilled labor (β=-0.71, p=0.55). Thus, H5a is supported for 
regulative and normative distance, but not for cognitive distance.  
Furthermore, Figure 4 suggests the degree of innovation capacity strengthens the 
negative association between cognitive distance and EMNCs’ ownership position, exhibiting the 
opposite direction of the hypothesized moderation effect in H5b. Facing larger cognitive 
distance, EMNCs from countries with high innovation capacity tend to take on a smaller 
ownership stake (simple slop β=-13.44, p=0.001). For EMNCs from countries with low levels of 
innovation capacity, their ownership position does not differ based on the extent of cognitive 
distance (simple slop β=1.34, p=0.78).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 18 and Figures 6-9 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Moreover, in H6, the global connectedness of EMNCs’ home countries is suggested to 
decrease the association between institutional distance and the EMNCs’ ownership position. As 
shown in Table 18, the extent of internet usage in the EMNCs’ home country moderates the 
association with ownership position across all three pillars of institutional distance, while foreign 
market size only moderates the association between regulative distance and ownership position 
at a significance level of 0.1.  Figures 6-9 further demonstrate the patterns of the moderation 
effect. In Figure 6, facing a larger regulative distance, EMNCs, originating from countries with 
high levels of internet usage tend to take lower ownership positions (simple slope β=-0.87, 




ownership position does not differ based on the degree of regulative distance (simple slope 
β=0.77, p=0.27). In terms of cognitive distance, Figure 8 reports a similar pattern. The negative 
association between cognitive distance and EMNCs’ ownership position exists for EMNCs 
originating from countries with high levels of internet usage (simple slope β=-7.76, p=0.001), but 
does not exist for EMNCs originating from countries with low levels of internet usage (simple 
slope β=0.77, p=0.75). Similarly, Figure 9 suggests that EMNCs from countries with high levels 
of internet usage tend to take smaller ownership positions to enter countries with larger 
normative distance (simple slope β=-4.01, p<0.001). Such a significant negative association 
between normative distance and ownership position does not exist for EMNCs from countries 
with low levels of internet usage (simple slope β=-1.20, p=0.38). In addition, Figure 7 suggests a 
cross-over moderation effect of foreign market size on the association between regulative 
distance and EMNCs’ ownership position. However, simple slope tests reveal EMNCs from 
countries with large (simple slop β=0.24, p=0.61) or small (simple slop β=-0.45, p=0.14) foreign 
market size do not significantly influence EMNCs’ ownership position decision while entering 
markets with different degrees of regulative distance.   
Therefore, the moderation effect of internet usage actually increases the association 
between the three pillars of institutional distance and the EMNCs’ ownership position, rendering 
contradictory support to H6a.  And there is minimal support for H6b because of the barely 
significant result associated with foreign market size. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 





Third, in terms of the moderation effects of the historical connections hypothesized in 
H7, only minimal support is found. Table 19 reports regression results associated with indicators 
of historical connections, including religious distance, language distance and free trade 
agreements with the U.S. In this set of analyses, VIF values are above 10 when the three 
indicators enter the regression models at the same time. To avoid the potential biased result due 
to multicollinearity, two indicators, religious distance and language distance, are separate from 
free trade agreement for regression analyses, as shown in Model 3-Model 6. VIF values in these 
models are below 10, suggesting multicollinearity is not a concern. The same approach was 
taken when conducting regression analyses for regulative distance and normative distance. Since 
the relationships of the predictors do not differ while separating the indicators into separate 
regression models, for the sake of parsimony, regression results using the three indicators in the 
same regression model are reported. 
Across all indicators of historical connections, the only significant interaction term occurs 
when language distance moderates the association between regulative distance and EMNCs’ 
ownership position as shown in Model 4. Figure 10 further demonstrates the moderation effect. 
For EMNCs originating from countries with large language distance from the U.S., cognitive 
distance is negatively associated with EMNCs’ ownership position (simple slope β=-11.09, 
p=0.003). When the EMNCs are from countries with small language distances, a marginally 
significant positive association is observed (simple slope β=6.872, p=0.08). Thus, language 
distance exacerbates the influence of cognitive distance on the EMNCs’ ownership position, 




2. EMNCS’ FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
In H8-H11, various firm level characteristics, including market position, international 
presence, media coverage, and cross-listing in U.S. markets, are hypothesized to decrease the 
influence of institutional distance on EMNCs’ ownership position. As shown in Table 20, the 
only significant interaction term, indicated in Model 6, occurs in the regression model of 
normative distance. Figure 11 further reveals the pattern of the interaction effect. Facing larger 
normative distance, EMNCs with low media coverage take higher ownership positions (simple 
slope β=8.12, p=0.03). For EMNCs with high media coverage, their ownership position is 
negatively related to normative distance (simple slope β=-5.56, p=0.04). In this case, media 
coverage nullifies the positive association between normative distance and the EMNC’s 
ownership position, rendering partial support for H10. In addition, there is no support for H8, 
H9, and H11. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 20 and Figure 11 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Finally, a set of competing hypotheses is offered to test EMNCs’ post-acquisition 
performance in relation to their ownership position. Since the previous hypotheses suggest that 
various measures of institutional distance influence EMNCs’ ownership position, the relationship 
between ownership position and firm performance is modeled controlling for the influence of 
institutional distance on ownership position by utilizing two-stage least-square regression models 
(Angrist & Krueger, 2001). In the first stage, the three pillars of institutional distance and control 
variables are entered as instrumental variables to compute estimated values of ownership 




firm performance, including changes in ROA, sales growth, and stock price in a three-year 
window after the acquisition event.  
  The regression results suggest EMNCs’ ownership position is positively related to 1-year 
(β=0.36, p=0.04), 2-year (β=0.75, p=0.01), and 3-year (β=0.63, p=0.02) sales growth after the 
acquisition event. In addition, EMNCs’ ownership position is not significantly related to the 
change in ROA or long-term stock performance. Therefore, we may conclude that controlling for 
the influence of institutional distance, higher ownership position contributes to better sales 
growth. 
C. SUMMARY  
Table 21 summarizes the hypotheses and correspondent results.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 21 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Given the rising phenomenon of EMNCs, the findings of this study contribute to the 
management literature in important ways. Utilizing institutional theory, I compare EMNCs’ 
entry mode decisions with other MNCs. The findings of this study may provide a foundation for 
a new internationalization theory as well as inform executives about their entry strategy for both 
EMNCs and AMNCs. Further, despite the common characteristics of a less developed economy, 
emerging markets can differ on several important dimensions. In this study, I differentiate among 
the levels of institutional constraints associated with EMNCs’ countries of origin by looking into 
various home market characteristics, including human capital, global connectedness, and 




findings of the study, and then the limitations of the study, potential future research directions, 
and implications for practice.  
A. COMPARISON OF AMNCS AND EMNCS IN RESPONSE TO INSTITUTIONAL 
DISTANCE 
First, I seek to determine whether institutional distance influences EMNCs’ ownership 
position differently than AMNCs’ ownership position. The evidence from the first phase 
suggests AMNCs are more susceptible to institutional distance in their ownership position than 
EMNCs. As expected, the cognitive and normative pillars of institutional distance are negatively 
associated with an AMNC’s ownership position. This finding is consistent with past literature in 
suggesting that when facing larger legitimacy concerns, as indicated by larger institutional 
distance, AMNCs are likely to take a smaller ownership position, thus relying more on the 
legitimacy of local partner firms. In addition, as expected, regulative distance has the weakest 
association among the three pillars of institutional distance with an AMNC’s ownership position. 
Equipped with organizational routines which can be adapted to comply with another set of 
sophisticated, regulatory institutional rules, AMNCs may find it easier to overcome legitimacy 
threats in relation to the regulative pillar than the other two pillars of institutional distance.  
On the other hand, in Phase One, the EMNCs’ ownership position decisions do not seem 
to be influenced by any of the pillars of institutional distance. However, in Phase Two with a 
larger sample of EMNCs, the empirical evidence offers a complex picture of how institutional 
distance influences EMNCs’ ownership decisions. At first, based on a larger sample of EMNCs, 
cognitive distance seems to exhibit the strongest negative association with EMNCs’ ownership 
position across the three pillars of institutional distance (refer to Table 16). Cognitive distance 




ownership position, thus rendering support for the legitimacy argument. Facing legitimacy 
concerns exhibited by national cultural differences, EMNCs opt for lower ownership positions, 
relying on local firms’ legitimacy to navigate in the host developed market. Overall, regulative 
distance and normative distance do not seem to influence an EMNC’s ownership position when 
not considering other home market characteristics.  
B. INTERACTION EFFECTS OF EMNCS’ HOME MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
AND INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE 
As I proceed to test H5-H11, it is further revealed that the three pillars of institutional 
distance demonstrate complex associations with EMNCs’ ownership position. First, in terms of 
the regulative pillar of institutional distance, as expected, when the EMNC’s home country 
suffers from low levels of human capital development as indicated by a lack of a skilled labor 
force, an EMNC’s ownership position is positively associated with regulative distance. Without 
the buffering effect of human capital development in their home economy, EMNCs would need 
to take on a greater ownership stake when faced with a large legitimacy deficit which may limit 
them from finding local firms willing to share ownership. This finding may also be explained by 
examining an EMNC’s strategic intent to enter a developed market. Lacking valuable human 
capital in their home country, EMNCs may view the acquisition in the developed market as a 
way to expediently upgrade their organizational capabilities to comply with a more sophisticated 
regulatory institutional environment. Specifically, acquiring a greater stake in a developed 
market target may signal an EMNC’s commitment to its stakeholders in implementing a higher 
quality of corporate governance. Thus, EMNCs tend to acquire more ownership when facing a 




In addition, global connectedness, as measured by high internet usage, buffers the 
stereotyping effect derived from regulative distance in a different way than human capital 
development. EMNCs, originating in countries well connected globally, through internet usage, 
may not be plagued by country of origin stereotypes associated with emerging economies. Thus, 
EMNCs may view regulative distance simply as a source of legitimacy threat, not dissimilar 
from the threat of cognitive and normative distance. To rely on local firms’ legitimacy, these 
EMNCs tend to take a smaller ownership stake when entering a country with larger regulative 
distance. On the other hand, EMNCs, originating from countries with low internet usage, may 
not have a choice but to acquire larger stakes when entering a developed market because these 
EMNCs suffer from an additional liability of foreignness and cannot easily find firms to partner 
with in the host market.  
Second, in terms of cognitive distance, high innovation capacity and high internet usage 
of the EMNCs’ home country promotes the likelihood for EMNCs to behave in a way similar to 
the way AMNCs react to legitimacy concerns in their ownership decisions. Like AMNCs, these 
EMNCs tend to take less ownership when entering a market with larger cognitive distance. 
Furthermore, one of the historical connection indicators, language distance, further exacerbates 
the influence of cognitive distance. EMNCs originating from a country with a larger language 
distance and cognitive distance tend to take even less ownership. Third, in terms of normative 
distance, global connectedness indicated by the extent of internet usage, once again, promotes 
the likelihood for EMNCs to behave in a similar way to AMNCs. Like AMNCs, facing larger 
normative distance, EMNCs originating from a globally connected emerging economy tend to 




Overall, human capital development which is indicated by skilled labor and innovation 
capacity, global connectedness which is indicated by internet usage, and historical connection 
which is indicated by language distance are important home market characteristics that 
differentiate emerging economies from each other. EMNCs, originating from various levels of 
country development on these indicators, formulate ownership decisions differently to enter a 
developed market. 
C. MODERATION EFFECTS OF EMNCS’ FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
Among the various firm characteristics considered, the only significant interaction effect 
is found while evaluating the moderation effect of media coverage on the association between 
normative distance and EMNCs’ ownership position (refer to Figure 11). Under less media 
coverage, EMNCs do not have the third-party endorsement necessary to eliminate developed 
market stakeholders’ legitimacy concerns. Thus, EMNCs with less media coverage are likely to 
take on more ownership facing large normative distance. On the other hand, EMNCs with media 
coverage can buffer the stereotyping associated with their country of origin, thus behaving in the 
same way as AMNCs. Facing large normative distance, EMNCs with media coverage take less 
ownership to rely on local partners’ legitimacy. 
  It is interesting that none of the other firm characteristics, including market position, 
international presence, and cross-listing, show moderation effects. This may suggest EMNCs 
cannot easily attain legitimacy through individual firm business activities to overcome the 




D. EMNCS’ OWNERSHIP POSITION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
The above findings suggest that various home country and firm level characteristics 
interact to influence EMNCs’ ownership position in their acquisition events in the U.S. 
Ownership position decisions are shown to be critical decisions to influence overall firm 
performance in the international literature (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Anderson & Gatignon, 
1986; Taylor, & Zou, S. 1998). Various contingencies, such as cultural distance and legitimacy 
concerns, have been proposed to study the relationship between ownership position and firm 
performance (Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005). In the context of EMNCs, I provide initial 
empirical evidence that ownership position is positively related to EMNCs’ sales grown. By 
acquiring larger stakes in the developed market targets, EMNCs are able to expand their sales 
volume in the subsequent years. However, EMNCs’ ownership position does not significantly 
influence their long-term stock performance and ROA.  
E. LIMITATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Based on pioneering studies of EMNCs’ entry strategy, I derive two major EMNC 
considerations, legitimacy arguments and strategic asset-seeking motives, for hypotheses 
building in the current study. Facing large institutional distance, an EMNC may tend to acquire 
more ownership in their acquisition targets either because large legitimacy deficits inhibit them 
from finding local firms to partner with or because these EMNCs desire dominant control to be 
able to transfer acquired strategic assets. The hypotheses in Phase Two take the legitimacy 
arguments further to examine various moderators which are suggested to buffer legitimacy 
threats associated with institutional distance. Based on the findings of the current study, while 
some home market characteristics show moderation effects, various firm level characteristics do 




decisions are influenced by their country of origin characteristics, but, with the lone exception of 
media coverage, not by their individual firm characteristics.  
Without a fine-grained study on the micro processes associated with the acquisition 
event, we will not be able to determine exactly how legitimacy or strategic considerations 
operate under various contingencies. As a first step for future studies, I suggest formally 
including an EMNC’s motivation to enter developed markets in building hypotheses. For 
instance, EMNCs in a knowledge intensive industry may have a stronger motivation to acquire 
complementary strategic assets in a developed market, so they have greater need to establish 
dominant control. Thus, given the same institutional distance, EMNCs in a knowledge intensive 
industry would acquire higher ownership stakes. One of the control variables in the current study 
provides initial evidence that EMNCs in high technology industries are likely to acquire more 
ownership (refer to the significant positive coefficients associated with “High Tech Industry” in 
Tables 16-20). Other indicators of EMNCs’ strategic intent can be more thoroughly examined in 
future studies. 
Along a similar line, I suggest that researchers further probe the performance 
implications of EMNCs’ ownership strategy. The finding in the current study provides initial 
evidence that, controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs’ ownership position is related to 
their performance outcomes. A closer examination may reveal a more detailed understanding. 
Particularly, recent research proposes that institutional deviance may not necessarily be a 
liability, and can be an advantage for foreign firms (Shi & Hoskisson, 2012). Firms, complying 
with institutional constraints, may gain legitimacy to increase their likelihood of survival and 
success. However, firms that deviate from institutional expectations may have a greater chance 




threats associated with their country of origin, are forced to take on a greater ownership stake, 
and lack the opportunity to rely on a local partner’s existing legitimacy. These EMNCs, 
however, may not necessarily be at a disadvantage to compete with established firms.  As shown 
in the current study, EMNCs with larger ownership stakes experience greater sales growth in 
subsequent years. Further examination of the interaction between degrees of institutional 
deviance and performance implications can be even more informative. In addition, future studies 
of the comparison between AMNCs and EMNCs on their post-acquisition performance can 
further reveal differences in the performance implications of their ownership positions. Do 
AMNCs, which largely rely on sharing ownership with local partnering firms to mitigate 
legitimacy threats, experience better post-acquisition performance than EMNCs that do not have 
the option to share ownership with local partners? 
Moreover, the United States is chosen as a single developed host market in the current 
study. In addition to the merits of the investment environment in the United States market, I 
deliberately choose a single target market because the construction of institutional distance is 
more straightforward without the complication of multiple host markets. In future studies, the 
findings of the current study can be compared with EMNCs’ entry into other developed markets 
such as the U.K. or Japan.   
F. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
These findings provide guidelines for practitioners to formulate effective strategies to 
respond to the challenges facing EMNCs in developed markets. The three pillars of institutional 
distance present different types of legitimacy requirements in the host, developed market. 
Additionally, various home market characteristics interact with the three pillars of institutional 




of EMNCs may use the findings of the current study as a reference to formulate their entry 
strategy in various developed markets. Which pillar of institutional distance present larger threats 
to their individual firm’s entry into the market? Do legitimacy threats need to be a primary 
concern or are there other, more important considerations, such as strategic control? 
In addition, as the frequency of EMNC acquisitions in developed markets increase, 
business executives of developed market firms have an increasing likelihood of either becoming 
the target of an EMNC’s acquisition or competing with EMNCs in acquiring other firms. An 
understanding of EMNCs’ acquisition pattern can provide invaluable insights when competing 
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Table 1 Top 100 Non-financial Multinational Companies from Emerging Economies in 2008 










Argentina Ternium SA Metal and metal products 7 063 64.5 
Brazil Vale S.A Mining & quarrying 19 635 38.3 
  Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobras Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 15 075 16.2 
  Metalurgica Gerdau S.A. Metal and metal products 13 658 48.6 
China CITIC Group Diversified 43 750 21 
  China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company Transport and storage 28 066 49.9 
  China National Petroleum Corporation Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 9 409 2.7 
  China State Construction Engineering Corp. Construction and real estate 7 015 16.6 
  Sinochem Corp. Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 6 409 36.8 
  China National Offshore Oil Corp. Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 5 247 9.4 
  China Communications Construction Co. Construction and real estate 4 010 12.1 
  Beijing Enterprises Holdings Ltd. Diversified 3 662 77 
  China Railway Construction Corporation Ltd Construction 3 146 9.1 
  ZTE Corp. Other consumer goods 3 143 44.2 
  Lenovo Group Electrical & electronic equipment 2 732 41.1 
  China Minmetals Corp. Metal and metal products 2 269 11.6 
  TPV Technology Limited Wholesale trade 2 266 69.8 
Egypt Orascom Telecom Holding Telecommunications 6 718 64.4 
Hong Kong, China Hutchison Whampoa Limited Diversified 70 762 82 
  Jardine Matheson Holdings Ltd Diversified 17 544 69.2 
  New World Development Co., Ltd. Diversified 9 061 37.5 
  China Resources Enterprises Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 7 371 89 
  China Merchants Holdings International Diversified 7 154 96.8 
  First Pacific Company Limited Electrical & electronic equipment 6 998 99 








  Orient Overseas International Ltd Transport and storage 6 412 67.3 
  CLP Holdings Utilities (Electricity, gas and water) 6 071 35.7 
  Li & Fung Limited Wholesale trade 4 761 90.3 
  Noble Group Limited Wholesale trade 4 346 42.2 
  Swire Pacific Limited Business services 3 903 37.7 
  Guangdong Investment Limited Diversified 3 749 95.1 
  Shougang Concord International Metal and metal products 2 630 89.1 
  Road King Infrastructure Limited Transport and storage 2 428 90.4 
  Techtronic Industries Company Limited Other equipments goods 2 334 81.8 
India Tata Steel Ltd. Metal and metal products 16 826 69.8 
  Oil And Natural Gas Corporation Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 13 477 23.8 
  Hindalco Industries Limited Diversified 8 564 71.6 
  Tata Motors Ltd Automobile 6 767 48.9 
  Suzlon Energy Limited Diversified 5 310 75.7 
South Korea Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Electrical & electronic equipment 28 765 54.2 
  Hyundai Motor Company Motor vehicles 28 359 36.5 
  LG Corp. Electrical & electronic equipment 13 256 43.8 
  STX Corporation Other equipments goods 8 308 34.5 
  Posco Metal and metal products 5 335 21.4 
Kuwait Zain Telecommunications 18 746 61.2 
  National Industries Group Holdings SAK Diversified 2 504 47.5 
  Agility Public Warehousing Company Construction and real estate 2 264 38.6 
Malaysia Petronas - Petroliam Nasional Bhd Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 28 447 29.6 
  Axiata Group Bhd Telecommunications 8 184 67.7 
  YTL Corp. Berhad Utilities (Electricity, gas and water) 7 014 47.8 
  Genting Berhad Other consumer services 5 139 47.9 
  Sime Darby Berhad Diversified 4 307 45.7 
  Tanjong Public Limited Company Pharmaceuticals 2 445 49.5 








  América Móvil Telecommunications 10 428 52.6 
  Telefonos De Mexico S.A. De C.V. Telecommunications 3 948 28.6 
  FEMSA-Fomento Economico Mexicano Food, beverages and tobacco 3 508 30.3 
Philippines San Miguel Corporation Food, beverages and tobacco 2 655 21.7 
Qatar Qatar Telecom Telecommunications 10 598 69.7 
Russian Federation Lukoil Petroleum and natural gas 21 515 42.2 
  Evraz Metal and metal products 11 196 47.5 
  Severstal Metal and metal products 8 066 30.2 
  JSFC Sistema Telecommunications 5 698 19.1 
  MMC Norilsk Nickel Metal and metal products 4 389 13.3 
  VimpelCom Telecommunications 3 726 21.8 
  Mechel Metal and metal products 2 911 16 
  TMK Metal and metal products 2 361 27.4 
Singapore Singtel Ltd. Telecommunications 17 326 63.2 
  Capitaland Limited Construction and real estate 9 852 60.9 
  Wilmar International Limited Food, beverages and tobacco 7 812 58.4 
  Flextronics International Ltd. Electrical & electronic equipment 5 338 65.2 
  Fraser & Neave Limited Food, beverages and tobacco 4 717 54.7 
  Keppel Corporation Limited Diversified 3 820 38.3 
  Neptune Orient Lines Ltd. Transport and storage 2 640 52.3 
South Africa MTN Group Limited Telecommunications 13 266 67.4 
  Sasol Limited Chemicals 6 679 29.6 
  Sappi Limited Wood and paper products 5 933 85.2 
  Netcare Limited Other consumer services 5 590 56.1 
  Steinhoff International holdings Other consumer goods 5 060 56.5 
  Gold Fields Limited Metal and metal products 4 839 35.7 
  Medi Clinic Corp. Limited Other consumer services 4 788 78.7 
  Naspers Limited Other consumer services 3 821 55.3 








  Hon Hai Precision Industries Electrical & electronic equipment 14 664 58.1 
  Asustek Computer Inc Electrical & electronic equipment 6 746 55.9 
  Quanta Computer Inc Electrical & electronic equipment 6 711 41.6 
  Pou Chen Corp. Other consumer goods 4 553 71.6 
  Acer Inc. Electrical & electronic equipment 4 455 79.9 
  Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Lt Electrical & electronic equipment 3 813 30.8 
  Chi MEI Optoelectronics Electrical & electronic equipment 3 070 11.9 
  United Microelectronics Corporation Electrical & electronic equipment 2 901 52.7 
  Inventec Company Electrical & electronic equipment 2 874 61.2 
  Compal Electronics Inc Other consumer goods 2 573 43.9 
  Qisda Corp. (Benq) Electrical & electronic equipment 2 441 53.5 
  Wistron Corp. Other equipments goods 2 316 42.7 
Thailand PTT Public Company Limited Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 2 525 10 
Turkey Enka Insaat ve Sanayi Construction and real estate 3 540 46.5 
  Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri AS Telecommunications 2 263 21.2 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Abu Dhabi National Energy Company Utilities (Electricity, gas and water) 13 519 69.5 
Venezuela Petróleos De Venezuela Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 19 244 21.5 
Source: UNCTAD/Erasmus University database 
a 
Industry classification for companies follows the United States Standard Industrial Classification as used by the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
b
 All data are based on the companies' annual reports unless otherwise stated. 
c
 TNI, the Transnationlity Index, is calculated as the average of the following three ratios: foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to 





Table 2 Emerging-Market Multinational Companies’ (EMNCs) Competitive Advantages  
Advantage Example References 
Cost advantage derived 
from the factor endowment 
of home country  
The access to low-cost labor 
pools; local knowledge of 
serving emerging market 
customers 
Aguiar, Bailey, Bhattacharya, 
Bradtke, Juan, Hemerling, et 
al.  2009; Mathews, 2002, 
2006 
Leveraging connections with 
AMNCs 
Working as suppliers for 
established MNCs 
Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009; 
Mathews, 2002, 2006 
Institutional 
entrepreneurship 
Adaptability to institutional 
environment with less clear 
formal institutional rules 
Caves, 1996; Lall, 1983; 
Lecraw, 1993; Guillen, & 
Garcia-Canal, 2009; 
Hoskisson, et al., 2000 
Network-ties with other 
EMNCs 
















Table 3 EMNC’s Legitimacy in a Developed Market 
 Definition (adapted from 
Kostova, 1997; Scott, 1995) 
Examples: EMNC’s potential challenges to 
establish legitimacy in a developed market 
Regulative 
pillar 
National differences in the 
existing laws and rules which 
promote certain types of 
behaviors and restrict others 
Listing and registration in a stock market 
(Karolyi, 1998; Marosi, & Massoud, 2008); 
accounting standards and investor protection 
procedures (Pagano, Roell, & Zechner, 2002); 
food and safety requirements; labor law; 
environmental protection procedures 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) 
Cognitive 
pillar  
National differences in the 
established cognitive structures, 
reflected in national cultural 
differences 
Cultural dimensions, such as individualism or 
collectivism (Hofstede, 1980)  
Normative 
pillar 
National differences in the 
societal values and norms in the 
institutional field 
Ethical beliefs in promoting corporate social 
responsibility (Tan & Wang, 2011); corporate 
governance practices to improve board 
independence (Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 
2010); organizational structures (Suchman, 
1995; Zaheer, 1995); societal values in basic 
human rights, such as freedom of speech  






Table 4 Equity-based Entry Mode 




Shared  1. Greenfield JV 3. Partial acquisition 
Full 2. Greenfield WOS 4.  Full acquisition 
*Greenfield operations refer to a foreign firm’s investment to start the 








Table 5 EMNC’s Entry Mode and Performance Research 
Authors Sample Independent variables Major results 
Aybar & 
Ficici (2009) 
433 merger and 
acquisitions by 
58 EMNCs 
Firm size, target is privately 
owned, value of the transaction 
to the bidder’s market value, 
level of development of the 
institutional infrastructure, 
geographic and/or cultural 
proximity, level of control 
(percentage of shares acquired) 
On average, cross-border expansions of EMNCs through 
acquisitions do not create value, but point to value destruction 
for more than half of the transactions analyzed. Target size, 
ownership structure of the target (private vs. public) and 
structure of the bidder (diversified vs. non-diversified) 
positively affect the bidder value, high-tech nature of the 
bidder and pursuit of targets in related industries negatively 
affect the bidder value. The stake pursued in the target firm 
and cultural distance positively affects value, but international 
experience and enhanced corporate governance do not. 







whether a firm is investing 
abroad in pursuit of a particular 
customer, whether a firm seeks 
complementary assets abroad, 
and the perceived institutional 
differences 
Firms with more firm-specific assets, less need for 
complementary assets, greater parental R&D capability, more 
international experience, and the tendency to following their 
customers are more likely to enter foreign markets by means of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. The firm’s perception of 
institutional difference weakens the positive relationship 
between complementary assets pursuit and joint venture 
because of great difficulty to coordinate with partners. 




Host competition, host industry 
growth, asset seeking 
motivation, global strategic 
infrastructure, industry 
groupings, R&D intensity, 
parent firm diversity, subsidiary 
Chinese firms prefer wholly owned subsidiary entry mode 
when they adopt a global strategy, face severe host industry 
competition, and seek strategic assets. A joint venture is 















investing in the 
Central Asian 
Republics 
Perceptions of arbitrariness, 
attitude towards FDI, risk of 
intervention, political & 
economic uncertainties, 
international relations of the host 
country, law and order 
uncertainties, size of operation, 
corruption, entry route to the 
host country, resource 
dependency 
Greater ethical-societal uncertainties result in a preference for 
joint venture over wholly owned subsidiary. There is a strong 
correlation between the perceived risk of intervention and joint 






Taiwan FDI in 
China; various 
industries 
Parent corporate governance, 
network relationship 
The choice of equity stake in an affiliate depends upon the 
extent of family and institutional share ownership in the parent 
company. High-commitment entry is found to be positively 
associated with the affiliate being located in areas with strong 
economic, cultural and historic links with the parent company. 
Furthermore, the entry mode and location decisions appear to 
be interrelated—the parent's equity stake in the affiliate 
depending, inter alia, upon the location within China, and the 







border M&A by 
Indian firms 
Firm age, firm size, average net 
profit margin, average export 
intensity, average leverage, 
annual market capitalization, 
foreign subsidiary, private target, 
business group affiliation, 
The magnitude of value created will be higher when the target 
firms are located in advanced economic and institutional 
environments, country markets that carry the promise of higher 
quality of resources, and therefore, offering stronger 

















market imperfection residuals 
Their ownership-specific advantages in areas such as corporate 
governance, inherited advantage from mergers and 
acquisitions of state-owned companies, and inward 
internationalization increase the level of outward 
internationalization. Market imperfection residuals, such as 














Cultural distance; market 
potential 
(1) firms from both the United States and emerging countries 
target countries that are culturally closer to their home 
countries, (2) a strong interaction effect occurs between market 
potential and cultural distance for emerging country firms as 
the market potential increases (i.e., at high market potential, 
firms from emerging economies are willing to overlook 
cultural distance), (3) no interaction effect occurs between 
market potential and cultural distance for U.S. firms, and (4) 
different cultural dimensions affect the market entry strategies 






Cultural distance  Wholly-owned subsidiaries do not perform better than joint 
ventures; Wholly-owned subsidiaries are preferred over joint 
ventures in a cultural distant host country; Malaysian MNEs 
perform better when they form wholly-owned subsidiaries 
entering culturally similar countries and when they form joint 
















Firm size, internationalization 
motives 
The largest textile firm (Taiwanese firm TC) invested in a 
joint-venture in Canada to produce feedstock (ethylene glycol) 
from natural gas—a backward integrative motive. 
Sun, Peng, 




by Chinese and 
Indian MNEs 
from 2000 to 
2008 
National-industry factor 
endowments; dynamic learning; 
value creation; reconfiguration 
of value chain; institutional 
facilitation and constraints 
P1: Comparatively, China will have intensive cross-border 
M&As in manufacturing industries, and India will have 
intensive cross-border M&As in service industries. P2: 
Comparatively, Chinese MNEs prefer to acquire companies in 
Asia, and Indian MNEs prefer to acquire companies in the 
United States and in Europe. P3: Both Chinese and Indian 
MNEs prefer friendly rather than hostile M&As when 
structuring M&A deals. Indian MNEs are more likely to adopt 
tender offer modes in M&A deals than Chinese MNEs because 
Indian MNEs’ M&As deals are more likely to occur in the 
United States and Europe than Chinese MNEs’ M&A 
deals.P4: Chinese MNEs prefer to acquire natural resource 
intensive firms, while Indian MNEs prefer to acquire 
technology intensive firms in cross-border M&As. Chinese 
MNEs prefer backward integration in cross-border M&As, 
while Indian MNEs prefer forward integration in cross-border 
M&As. P5: In large-scale cross-border M&As, Chinese state-
owned enterprises generally play the lead role among Chinese 











Table 6 Summary of Hypotheses 
Phase Main Predictors Hypotheses 
Phase One  
AMNCs & 
EMNCs 
Institutional distance H1: For AMNCs, institutional distance, including regulative distance (H1a), cognitive 
distance (H1b), and normative distance (H1c), is negatively associated with their 
ownership position in a cross-border merger and acquisition event in a developed 
market. 
  H2: For EMNCs, institutional distance, including regulative distance (H2a), cognitive 
distance (H2b), and normative distance (H2c), is positively associated with their 
ownership position in a cross-border merger and acquisition event in a developed 
market. 
 Differential effects of three 
pillars of institutional distance  
H3: For AMNCs, the effect of the regulative pillar of institutional distance on 
ownership position has the least influence among the three pillars of institutional 
distance. 
  H4: For EMNCs, the effect of the regulative pillar of institutional distance on 
ownership position is the strongest among the three pillars of institutional distance.  
Phase Two 
EMNCs 
Home market characteristics H5: Human capital development in an EMNC’s home country moderates the 
relationship between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such 
that human capital development, including skilled labor (H5a) and innovative capacity 
(H5b), decreases the influence of institutional distance on an EMNC’s ownership 
position in a developed market. 
  H6: The global connectedness of an EMNC’s home country moderates the 
relationship between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such 
that the global connectedness of an EMNC’s home country decreases the influence of 
institutional distance on an EMNC’s ownership position in a developed market. 
  H7: The historical connections of an EMNC’s home country to the host developed 
market moderates the relationship between institutional distance and an EMNC’s 
ownership position such that the historical connections of an EMNC’s home country 
decreases the influence of institutional distance on an EMNC’s ownership position in 
a developed market. 
 Firm characteristics  H8: The extent of an EMNC’s market leading position moderates the relationship 
between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that an 








its ownership position in a developed market. 
  H9: An EMNC’s international presence moderates the relationship between 
institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that an EMNC’s 
international presence decreases the influence of institutional distance on its 
ownership position in a developed market. 
  H10: Media coverage of an EMNC moderates the relationship between institutional 
distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that media coverage in a developed 
market decreases the influence of institutional distance on its ownership position in a 
developed market. 
  H11: An EMNC’s cross-listing in a developed market moderates the relationship 
between institutional distance and an EMNC’s ownership position such that an 
EMNC’s cross-listing in a developed market decreases the influence of institutional 
distance on its ownership position in a developed market. 
 Firm performance H12a: Controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs with a higher ownership position 
experience better post-acquisition overall firm performance. 
H12b: Controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs with a lower ownership position 












Table 7 Acquirers’ Country of Origin in Cross-border Merger and Acquisition Events with the 













*The number in the brackets following the nation indicates the frequency of M&As from the 
country in the sample period between 2005 and 2011. 
**These countries meet only one criterion to be classified as developed markets, and therefore 
these countries are classified as emerging markets in the current study. 
AMNCs’  M&As* EMNCs’ M&As* 
Canada(376); U.K.(222); Japan(59); 
France(58); Australia(57); Germany(56); 
Switzerland(36); Netherlands(33); 
Israel(28); Sweden(25);  Spain(20); 
Ireland(14); Norway(14);  Italy(13); 
Denmark(11); New Zealand(8); 
Austria(7); Belgium(5);  Finland(5); 
Greece(3); Luxembourg(3); Poland(2); 
Portugal(2); Estonia(1); Iceland(1)  
India(53); China(21); Bermuda(16); Hong 
Kong(15); Singapore(14); South 
Korea**(13); Russian Fed(11); Taiwan(11); 
Brazil(10); British Virgin Islands(6); 
Colombia(5);; Mexico**(5); Bahamas(4); 
Guernsey(4); Malaysia(4); Cyprus(3); 
Philippines(3); South Africa(3); 
Argentina(2); Chile**(2); Kuwait(2); 
Thailand(2); Turkey**(2); United Arab 
Emirates(2); Vietnam(2); Barbados(1); 
Belize(1); Cayman Islands(1); Georgia(1); 
Latvia(1); Lebanon(1); Macau(1); 





Table 8 Measure of Normative Pillar of Institutional Distance 
Corporate practice  Survey items Scale 
Corporate 
governance 
How would you characterize 
corporate governance by 
investors and boards of directors 
in your country? 
1 = management has little 
accountability to investors and boards; 
7 = investors and boards exert strong 
supervision of management decisions 
Employee training To what extent do companies in 
your country invest in training 
and employee development? 
1 = hardly at all; 7 = to a great extent 
Customer 
orientation 
How well do companies in your 
country treat customers? 
1 = generally treat their customers 
badly; 7 = are highly responsive to 
customers and customer retention 
Buyer 
sophistication 
In your country, how do buyers 
make purchasing decisions? 
1 = based solely on the lowest price; 7 




To what extent is pay in your 
country related to productivity? 
1 = not related to worker productivity; 





In your country, who holds senior 
management positions? 
1 = usually relatives or friends without 
regard to merit; 7 = mostly 
professional managers chosen for 




In your country, how 
sophisticated are production 
processes 
1 = not at all – labor-intensive 
methods or previous generations of 
process technology prevail; 7 = highly 
– the world's best and most efficient 
process technology prevails 
Willingness to 
delegate authority 
In your country, how do you 
assess the willingness to delegate 
authority to subordinates? 
1 = low – top management controls all 
important decisions; 7 = high – 
authority is mostly delegated to 














Measure Survey items Scale 
Skilled 
labor 
How would you assess the quality of 
management or business schools in your 
country? 
1=”very poor” to 7=”excellent—
among the best in the world.” 
 How would you rate the level of access 
to the Internet in schools in your 
country? 
1=”very limited”; 7=”extensive” 
 How would you assess the quality of 
math and science education in your 
country's schools?  
1 = “poor”; 7 = “excellent - among the 
best in the world” 
 How well does the educational system 
in your country meet the needs of a 
competitive economy? 
1 = “not well at all”; 7 = “very well” 
Innovative 
capacity 
To what extent are scientists and 
engineers available in your country? 
1=”not at all”; 7=”widely available” 
 How would you assess the quality of 
scientific research institutions in your 
country? 
1=”very poor”; 7=” the best in their 
field internationally” 
 To what extent do business and 
universities collaborate on research and 
development (R&D) in your country?  
1 = “do not collaborate at all”; 7 = 
“collaborate extensively” 
 To what extent are the latest 
technologies available in your country?  
1 = “not available”; 7 = “widely 
available” 
 In your country, how do companies 
obtain technology?  
1 = “exclusively from licensing or 
imitating foreign companies”; 7 = “by 
conducting formal research and 





Table 10 Country scores of religious distance and language distance from the U.S. 
 Country Language distance Religious distance M&A deals counts 
Argentina -0.69 -1.29 2 
Brazil 0.27 -1.29 15 
Chile -0.69 -1.29 3 
China 0.53 1.01 43 
Colombia -0.69 -1.29 4 
Hong Kong 0.53 -0.51 34 
India -2.43 1.27 169 
Indonesia 0.53 0.76 2 
Kenya -2.43 -1.03 1 
Kuwait 0.05 0.76 3 
Malaysia 0.53 0.76 6 
Mexico -0.69 -1.29 24 
Panama -0.69 -1.03 1 
Peru -0.69 -1.29 1 
Philippines -2.43 -1.29 5 
Russian Fed 0.27 -0.53 14 
Saudi Arabia 0.05 0.76 2 
Singapore -2.43 1.01 24 
South Africa -2.43 -0.78 11 
South Korea 0.53 -0.52 46 
Taiwan 0.53 1.01 34 
Thailand 0.53 1.27 2 
Turkey 0.53 1.02 1 
Utd Arab Em 0.05 0.76 2 
Vietnam 0.53 1.01 1 




Table 11 Mean, Standard Deviation, and Correlation among Variables Used in the Regression in 
Phase One (N=1650) 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Ownership position 90.1 23.79           
2. Year2006Dummy 0.15 0.35 0.02         
3. Year2007Dummy 0.19 0.39 0.04 -0.2**       




0.22**     






0.16**   


















8. Total assets 6.43 2.8 -0.04* -0.05* 0.02 0.13** -0.03 
9. High tech industry 0.15 0.35 0.08** 0 0 0.03 -0.03 
10. Geographic 




0.06** 0.09** 0.06** -0.03 
11. Home country 
status 0.11 0.32 
-
0.12** 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0 
12. Regulative 
distance 7.77 7.86 0.01 0.01 0 0.04 -0.02 
13. Cognitive distance 1.09 1.21 
-
0.16** -0.05* 0.01 0.04 0.02 
14. Normative 




0.11** 0.08** 0 
 
 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
7. Year2011Dummy 
-
0.15**               
8. Total assets -0.02 -0.04*             








0.09** 0.42** 0.16**         
11. Home country 
status 0 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.33**       
12. Regulative 
distance -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0 0     











*p-value<0.05 **p-value <0.001; Both total assets and geographic distance variables have been 
transformed into natural logs. 
“Home country status”: 1=emerging market; 0=developed market 
“Total assets” refers to the acquiring firm's total assets prior to the acquisition. 














Year 2006 dummy -0.041   -0.042   -0.047   
Year 2007 dummy -0.017   -0.038   -0.042   
Year 2008 dummy -0.028   -0.034   -0.034   
Year 2009 dummy -0.134 ** -0.136 ** -0.137 ** 
Year 2010 dummy -0.087 ** -0.097 ** -0.099 ** 
Year 2011 dummy -0.054   -0.066   -0.069 * 
Total Assets 0.014   0.024   0.017   
High Tech Industry 0.101 ** 0.095 ** 0.094 ** 
Geographic Distance -0.125 ** -0.038   -0.008 ** 











 Cognitive Distance  
 
 
-0.111 ** -0.115 ** 
Normative Distance 
  
-0.079 * -0.143 ** 
Home Country Status X Regulative 
Distance     
0.008 
 











Observations 1650   1650   1650   
Adjusted R
2
 0.03   0.045   0.051   
Change in R
2
 from the previous 
model 
    0.018 ** 0.007 ** 
N=1650 




Table 13 Subsample Regression Analyses for EMNCs and AMNCs 
  AMNCs   EMNCs   
Year 2006 dummy -0.043   -0.162   
Year 2007 dummy -0.053   -0.147   
Year 2008 dummy -0.031   -0.123   
Year 2009 dummy -0.131 ** -0.274 * 
Year 2010 dummy -0.12 ** -0.247 * 
Year 2011 dummy -0.064   -0.36 ** 
Total Assets 0.028   -0.061   
High Tech Industry 0.088 ** 0.11   
Geographic Distance 0.017   -0.184   




Cognitive Distance  -0.148 ** -0.066 
 
Normative Distance -0.137 ** -0.053 
 
Observations 1465   185   
Adjusted R
2
 0.038   0.065   




Table 14 Merger and Acquisitions by EMNCs in Phase Two by Acquisition Years and 
Acquirer’s Home Country 
  Acquisition years   
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Anguilla 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Argentina 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Bahamas 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 
Bermuda 1 5 6 7 2 4 4 29 
Brazil 0 2 0 3 1 6 3 15 
British Virgin 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Cayman Islands 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Chile 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
China 2 1 5 11 5 9 10 43 
Colombia 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Cyprus 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Guernsey 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Hong Kong 3 11 4 4 2 3 7 34 
India 25 24 45 24 14 22 15 169 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Isle of Man 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Jersey 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Kenya 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Kuwait 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
Malaysia 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 6 
Mexico 2 8 0 3 2 2 7 24 
Neth Antilles 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Panama 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Philippines 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 5 
Russian Federation 0 1 1 9 3 0 0 14 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Singapore 4 5 5 4 1 5 0 24 
South Africa 1 0 5 3 0 1 1 11 
South Korea 2 5 6 5 12 9 7 46 




Thailand 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Turkey 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Utd Arab Emirates 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Vietnam 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Zimbabwe 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 










Table 15 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations in Phase Two 
 Mean SD N 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Ownership position 84.82 29.11 467       
2. Total assets 6776800 22502900 455 -0.14**      
3. High tech industry 0.46 0.50 496 0.17** -0.08     
4. Geographic distance 9.20 0.57 495 0.01 -0.12* 0.23**    
5. Regulative distance 13.28 12.22 456 0 -0.01 0 0.04   
6. Cognitive distance 2.72 1.29 431 -0.20** 0.12* -0.10* -0.07 -0.32**  
7. Normative distance 5.93 3.78 497 0 0.02 -0.14** -0.04 0.62** -0.3** 
8. Innovation capacity 17.21 1.94 453 0.01 -0.05 0.24** 0.47** -0.43** 0.48** 
9. Skilled labor 18.77 2.77 454 0.08 -0.14** 0.28** 0.55** -0.56** 0.21** 
10. Free trade 0.11 0.32 497 0.06 -0.02 -0.11* -0.4** -0.39** 0.07 
11. Religious distance 0.45 0.97 451 0.18** -0.24** 0.34** 0.63** 0.35** -0.33** 
12. Language distance -0.98 1.40 451 -0.17** 0.19** -0.19** -0.26** -0.33** 0.75** 
13. Internet users 28.67 26.53 452 -0.18** 0.17** -0.04 -0.02 -0.74** 0.73** 
14. Foreign market size 5.91 0.58 450 -0.03 -0.03 0.15** 0.18** 0.31** 0.14** 
15. Market position 1.00 2.21 461 -0.02 0.59** 0.05 -0.29** -0.16** 0.22** 
16. Crosslisting 0.27 0.44 497 0.09 0.14** -0.04 -0.37** -0.19** 0.07 
17. Media coverage 0.45 0.51 497 0 0.19** -0.07 0 -0.14** 0 
18. Geographic dispersion 3.48 2.06 367 0 0.1 -0.12* -0.22** -0.26** 0.24** 
19. Sales growth t+1 0.43 1.97 401 0.07 -0.05 0.09 0.08 0.08 -0.12* 
20. Sales growth t+2 2.47 32.42 338 0.03 -0.12* -0.05 0.04 0.18** -0.15** 
21. Sales growth t+3 1.05 2.54 270 0.14* -0.13* 0.12* 0.16** 0.16* -0.21** 
22. Stock price t+1 0.33 2.19 391 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0 0.07 0.07 
23. Stock price t+2 0.49 2.67 331 -0.09 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.1 0.08 
24. Stock price t+3 0.12 1.25 266 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.06 -0.04 
25. Income growth t+1 1.15 14.55 407 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.05 








27. Income growth t+3 0.64 13.50 277 0.06 -0.03 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.02 
 
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
8. Innovation capacity -0.73**         
9. Skilled labor -0.72** 0.84**        
10. Free trade 0.09 -0.08 -0.02       
11. Religious distance -0.14** 0.35** 0.42** -0.29**      
12. Language distance -0.15** 0.2** -0.01 -0.12** -0.48**     
13. Internet users -0.65** 0.58** 0.49** 0.12* -0.37** 0.65**    
14. Foreign market size -0.1* 0.22** 0.14** -0.29** 0.44** 0.1399 -0.04   
15. Market position -0.16** -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.27** 0.27** 0.3** -0.05  
16. Crosslisting -0.24** -0.1* -0.09 0.16** -0.23** 0.17** 0.14** 0.1* 0.35** 
17. Media coverage -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.08 0.12* 0.04 0.19** 
18. Geographic dispersion -0.03 -0.14* -0.11* 0.18** -0.46** 0.3** 0.27** -0.12* 0.22** 
19. Sales growth t+1 0.04 0 0.03 -0.05 0.11* -0.11* -0.11* 0 -0.08 
20. Sales growth t+2 0.14* -0.14* -0.1 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.27** -0.1 
21. Sales growth t+3 0.14* 0 0.03 -0.1 0.2** -0.2** -0.22** 0.06 -0.15* 
22. Stock price t+1 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 
23. Stock price t+2 0.15** -0.08 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09 0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 
24. Stock price t+3 0.15* -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 
25. Income growth t+1 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.06 -0.08 0.02 -0.04 
26. Income growth t+2 -0.13* 0.14* 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.26** -0.05 
27. Income growth t+3 0.02 0 0 -0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.08 -0.03 
 
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
17. Media coverage 0.21**           








19. Sales growth t+1 -0.08 -0.09 -0.13*         
20. Sales growth t+2 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 0.02        
21. Sales growth t+3 -0.09 -0.08 -0.14* 0.75** 0.84**       
22. Stock price t+1 -0.07 -0.03 0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.2**      
23. Stock price t+2 -0.08 -0.02 0.06 0 0.08 0.17** 0.93**     
24. Stock price t+3 -0.13* 0.01 -0.19** -0.04 0.01 0.13* 0.39** 0.58**    
25. Income growth t+1 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03   
26. Income growth t+2 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.98** -0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.01 0.01  




Table 16 Three Pillars of Institutional Distance and EMNCs’ Ownership Position in Phase Two 
 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
Year 2006 dummy -0.053   -0.038   -0.055   -0.026   
Year 2007 dummy -0.047   -0.048   -0.046   -0.011   
Year 2008 dummy -0.127   -0.09   -0.16 * -0.057   
Year 2009 dummy -0.196 ** -0.158 * -0.212 ** -0.132   
Year 2010 dummy -0.165 * -0.153 * -0.153 * -0.126   
Year 2011 dummy -0.125 ^ -0.115   -0.124 ^ -0.087   
Total Assets -0.123 * -0.107 * -0.113 * -0.105 * 
High Tech Industry 0.162 ** 0.147 ** 0.184 ** 0.149 ** 
Geographic Distance -0.045   -0.032   -0.061   -0.01   


























 0.052   0.08   0.063   0.079   




Table 17 Human Capital Development in EMNCs’ Home Country  
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Year 2006 dummy -0.043 -0.054 -0.038 -0.038 -0.034 -0.04 
Year 2007 dummy -0.042 -0.047 -0.035 -0.01 -0.011 0.009 
Year 2008 dummy -0.117 -0.137^ -0.052 -0.012 -0.093 -0.078 
Year 2009 dummy -0.183* -0.193** -0.127^ -0.097 -0.165* -0.154^ 
Year 2010 dummy -0.165* -0.186* -0.126 -0.076 -0.14 -0.129 
Year 2011 dummy -0.131 -0.142* -0.095 -0.055 -0.105 -0.077 
Total Assets -0.098^ -0.104* -0.094^ -0.1^ -0.1^ -0.104* 
High Tech Industry 0.15** 0.162** 0.128* 0.133* 0.154** 0.166** 
Geographic Distance -0.062 -0.123 -0.128^ -0.224* -0.046 -0.003 
Regulative Distance 0.035 0.188* 
    Cognitive Distance  
  
-0.219** -0.262** 
  Normative Distance 
    
0.05 0.102 
Skilled Labor 0.22^ 0.189 0.133 0.055 0.206^ 0.158 
Innovation Capacity -0.18^ -0.111 0.022 0.291^ -0.152 -0.086 








    Cognitive Distance X 
Skilled Labor 
   
-0.008 
  Cognitive Distance X 
Innovation Capacity 
   
-0.212^ 
  Normative Distance X 
Skilled Labor 
     
-0.232* 
Normative Distance X 
Innovation Capacity 
     
0.165 
Observations 381 381 364 364 381 381 
Adjusted R
2
 0.058 0.068 0.085 0.103 0.058 0.064 
Change in R
2












Table 18 Global Connectedness of EMNCs’ Home Country  
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Year 2006 dummy -0.046 -0.045 -0.063 -0.082 -0.116 -0.078 
Year 2007 dummy -0.049 -0.03 -0.08 -0.104 -0.238* -0.169 
Year 2008 dummy -0.095 -0.079 -0.13* -0.185* -0.231** -0.174^ 
Year 2009 dummy -0.139 -0.111 -0.197* -0.225** -0.244** -0.189* 
Year 2010 dummy -0.125 -0.119 -0.194^ -0.233* -0.261** -0.217* 
Year 2011 dummy -0.081 -0.061 -0.155^ -0.199* -0.217* -0.163^ 
Total Assets -0.07 -0.061 -0.106** -0.086 -0.079 -0.067 
High Tech Industry 0.152** 0.157** 0.15 0.169** 0.13* 0.126* 
Geographic Distance -0.023 -0.109 -0.041^ -0.035 -0.141* -0.131^ 
Regulative Distance -0.294** -0.028 
    Cognitive Distance  
  
-0.159 -0.151^ 
  Normative Distance 
    
-0.292** -0.299* 
Internet User -0.35*** -0.309*** 0.006 0.098 -0.309*** -0.384*** 
Foreign Market Size 0.069 -0.044 0.032 0.097 -0.006 0.026 
Regulative Distance 
X Internet Users   -0.257*         
Regulative Distance 
X Foreign Market 
Size   0.11^         
Cognitive Distance 
X Internet Users 
   
-0.182** 
  Cognitive Distance 
X Foreign Market 
Size 
   
-0.092 
  Normative Distance 
X Internet Users           -0.134* 
Normative Distance 
X Foreign Market 
Size           -0.058 
Observations 377 377 361 361 377 377 
Adjusted R
2




the previous model       0.023*   0.013^ 








Table 19 Historical Connections of EMNCs’ Home Country with the U.S.  
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Year 2006 dummy -0.029 -0.027 -0.036 -0.021 -0.016 -0.018 -0.02 -0.027 
Year 2007 dummy -0.029 -0.025 -0.044 -0.013 -0.024 -0.026 -0.014 -0.019 
Year 2008 dummy -0.082 -0.075 -0.086 -0.061 -0.056 -0.059 -0.079 -0.087 
Year 2009 dummy -0.152* -0.15* -0.159* -0.129^ -0.125^ -0.125^ -0.147^ -0.154^ 
Year 2010 dummy -0.147* -0.149* -0.152* -0.139^ -0.136^ -0.139^ -0.138^ -0.143 
Year 2011 dummy -0.102 -0.107 -0.122 -0.104 -0.087 -0.087 -0.088 -0.09 
Total Assets -0.07 -0.069 -0.085 -0.078 -0.09^ -0.096^ -0.075 -0.076 
High Tech Industry 0.11* 0.11* 0.127* 0.136* 0.135* 0.138* 0.121* 0.12* 
Geographic Distance -0.124 -0.184 -0.14* -0.178* 0.079 0.007 -0.026 -0.034 
Regulative Distance -0.076 0.028 
      Cognitive Distance  
  
-0.169* -0.091 -0.171** -0.182** 
  Normative Distance 
      
0.029 0.036 
Religious Distance 0.213* 0.201* 0.198* 0.351* 
  
0.172* 0.173* 
Language Distance -0.065 -0.021 0.083 0.141 
  
-0.019 -0.018 
Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. 0.058 -0.038 
  
0.169* 0.108 0.14^ 0.112 




      Regulative Distance X Language Distance -0.064 
      Regulative Distance X Free Trade Agreement -0.199 
      Cognitive Distance X Religious 
Distance 
   
-0.122 
    Cognitive Distance X Language 
Distance 
   
-0.279* 
    Cognitive Distance X Free Trade Agreement 
    
0.062 
  Normative Distance X Religious 
Distance 
       
-0.053 
Normative Distance X Language Distance 









Normative Distance X Free Trade Agreement             -0.038 
Observations 379 379 364 364 364 364 379 379 
Adjusted R
2
 0.081 0.076 0.088 0.11 0.094 0.092 0.079 0.073 
Change in R
2





Table 20 EMNCs’ Firm Characteristics 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Year 2006 dummy -0.043 -0.033 -0.035 -0.034 -0.046 -0.042 
Year 2007 dummy -0.008 0 0.002 0.002 -0.008 0.027 
Year 2008 dummy -0.186* -0.18* -0.157 -0.167 -0.206* -0.189* 
Year 2009 dummy -0.183* -0.183* -0.169* -0.164 -0.226** -0.212** 
Year 2010 dummy -0.158 -0.156 -0.158 -0.168 -0.143 -0.121 
Year 2011 dummy -0.162 -0.158 -0.169 -0.172 -0.154 -0.133 
Total Assets -0.099 -0.073 -0.115 -0.146 -0.107 -0.089 
High Tech Industry 0.211* 0.218* 0.191** 0.184* 0.237** 0.258** 
Geographic Distance 0.003* -0.016 0.027 0.025 -0.008 -0.017 
Regulative Distance -0.001 0.019 
    Cognitive Distance  
  
-0.04 -0.014 
  Normative Distance 
    
-0.014 0.017 
Market Position -0.078 -0.128 -0.03 0.075 -0.075 -0.125 
International presence 0.075 0.085 0.085 0.097 0.065 0.085 
Crosslisting 0.166* 0.148* 0.168* 0.139 0.123 0.108 
Media Coverage -0.084 -0.078 -0.115 -0.114 -0.016 -0.021 




    Regulative Distance X 
International Presence -0.026 




    Regulative Distance X 
Media Coverage  
 
0.003 
    Cognitive Distance X 
Market Position 
   
-0.143 




  Cognitive Distance X 
Crosslisting 
   
0.114 
  Cognitive Distance X 
Media Coverage  
   
0.018 
  Normative Distance X 
Market Position 
     
-0.06 
Normative Distance X 
International Presence  
    
-0.024 
Normative Distance X 
Crosslisting 
     
-0.078 
Normative Distance X 
Media Coverage           -0.127* 






 0.096 0.089 0.102 0.101 0.102 0.119 
Change in R
2
 from the 
previous model   0.006   0.012   0.027* 





























Table 21 Hypotheses and results 
 




H1: For AMNCs, regulative distance (H1a), cognitive distance (H1b), 
and normative distance (H1c) are negatively related to ownership 
position. 
H1b & c are supported 
  H2: For EMNCs, regulative distance (H2a), cognitive distance (H2b), 
and normative distance (H2c) are positively related to ownership 
position. 
Not supported 
  H3: For AMNCs, the effect of the regulative pillar of institutional 
distance on ownership position has the least influence. 
Supported 
  H4: For EMNCs, the effect of the regulative pillar of institutional 




H5: Human capital development in an EMNC’s home country, 
including skilled labor (H5a) and innovative capacity (H5b), decreases 
the influence of institutional distance. 
H5a is supported for regulative and 
normative distance but not supported for 
cognitive distance; H5b is not supported. 
  H6: The global connectedness of an EMNC’s home country, including 
internet usage (H6a) and foreign market size (H6b) decreases the 
influence of institutional distance on an EMNC’s ownership position. 
The opposite effects are found for H6a: 
internet usage strengthens the influences 
of institutional distance on EMNCs' 
ownership. No support is found for H6b. 
  H7: The historical connections of an EMNC’s home country to the host 
developed market decrease the influence of institutional distance on an 
EMNC’s ownership position in a developed market. 
Partially supported by the moderation 
effect of language distance on the 
association between cognitive distance 
and ownership position. 
  H8: An EMNC’s market leading position decreases the influence of 
institutional distance on its ownership position in a developed market. 
Not supported 
  H9: An EMNC’s international presence decreases the influence of 
institutional distance on its ownership position in a developed market. 
Not supported 
  H10: Media coverage of an EMNC in a developed market decreases the 
influence of institutional distance on its ownership position in a 
developed market. 
Supported for normative distance. 
  H11: An EMNC’s cross-listing in a developed market decreases the 










  H12a: Controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs with a greater 
ownership position have better firm performance. 
Higher ownership position leads to better 
sales growth 
  H12b: Controlling for institutional distance, EMNCs with a lower 
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The Extent of EMNCs’ Media Coverage and Normative Distance 
 
 
 
